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Just Do It! Specific Rulemaking on Materiality
Guidance in Insider Trading
Joan MacLeod Heminway*
Issuers, investors, and regulators have struggled with applying
the materiality test since the enactment of the securities laws.1
I. INTRODUCTION
Insider trading has been in the news on a relatively constant
basis in the new millennium. Raj Rajaratnam and associates,2 Mark
Cuban,3 and Martha Stewart4 have been among the many subjects
of legal actions involving insider trading since the Enron debacle
in 2002. Some of these cases have been garden-variety insider
trading cases; others have exposed confusing and evolving
elements of U.S. insider trading doctrine.5 Most recently,
Copyright 2012, by JOAN MACLEOD HEMINWAY.
* College of Law Distinguished Professor of Law, The University of
Tennessee College of Law; A.B. 1982, Brown University; J.D. 1985, New York
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University School of Law, and The University of Tennessee Corporate
Governance Center. Finally, I owe personal thanks to, among others, Afra
Afsharipour, Joe Carcello, Leah Muriel, Michael Perino, and Cheryl Wade for
helping me think through some of the issues in this article. Their suggestions
were invaluable.
1. Paul S. Atkins, Commissioner, Remarks to the ‘SEC Speaks in 2008’
Program of the Practising Law Institute, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (Feb. 8,
2008), http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2008/spch020808psa.htm.
2. See Press Release, SEC Charges Billionaire Hedge Fund Manager Raj
Rajaratnam with Insider Trading, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (Oct. 16, 2009),
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2009/2009-221.htm; see also Press Release, SEC
Obtains Record $92.8 Million Penalty Against Raj Rajaratnam, U.S. SEC. &
EXCH. COMM’N (Nov. 8, 2011), http://sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-233.htm.
3. See Press Release, SEC Files Insider Trading Charges Against Mark
Cuban, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (Nov. 17, 2008), http://www.sec.gov/news/
press/2008/2008-273.htm.
4. See Press Release, SEC Charges Martha Stewart, Broker Peter
Bacanovic with Illegal Insider Trading, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (June 4,
2003), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2003-69.htm; see also Press Release,
SEC Charges Martha Stewart, Broker Peter Bacanovic with Illegal Insider
Trading, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (Aug. 7, 2006), http://www.sec.gov/news/
press/2006/2006-134.htm.
5. See generally, e.g., MARTHA STEWART’S LEGAL TROUBLES (Joan
MacLeod Heminway ed., 2007) (exploring, especially in chapters 1, 5, and 10,
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congressional hearings on the STOCK Act6—a bill providing for
an express congressional prohibition on insider trading—have made
headlines.7 Public reporting in connection with both recent legal
actions and the introduction and passage of the STOCK Act also
has brought to the fore long-debated questions about insider
trading doctrine in the United States, including the unsettled nature
of the system of regulation.8 This article urges the U.S. Securities
and Exchange Commission (“SEC”)—or, absent action by the
SEC, the federal judiciary—to adopt clarifying guidance on
materiality—one unclear area of insider trading law.

various uncertainties in insider trading policy and doctrine exposed in
connection with the SEC insider trading enforcement action brought against
Martha Stewart); Joan MacLeod Heminway, Martha Stewart and the Forbidden
Fruit: A New Story of Eve, 2009 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1017 (using the Stewart case
to identify unclear aspects of U.S. insider trading law); Anthony Michael Sabino
& Michael A. Sabino, From Chiarella to Cuban: The Continuing Evolution of
the Law of Insider Trading, 16 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 673 (2011)
(describing the uncertain state of the requisite breach of a duty of trust and
confidence after the trial and appellate court opinions in the Cuban case).
6. See Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge Act, S. 2038, 112th
Cong. (2012), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-112s2038eah/
pdf/BILLS-112s2038eah.pdf (House amendment of Senate bill, adopted on
February 9, 2012).
7. See Paul Kane, Ethics reform bill to ban insider trading by Congress
members, executive branch passed by House, WASH. POST, Feb. 9, 2012,
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/ethics-reform-bill-to-baninsider-trading-by-congress-members-executive-branch-passed-by- house /2012/
02/09/gIQAV3MS1Q_story.html; Robert Pear, House Passes Bill Banning
Insider Trading by Members of Congress, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 2012, available
at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/10/us/politics/house-passes-bill-banninginsider-trading-by-members-of-congress.html.
8. See, e.g., Matthew Goldstein, Steve Cohen says insider trading rules are
“vague,” REUTERS, Dec. 13, 2011, http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/12/13/ ussac-cohen-deposition-idUSTRE7BC1UJ20111213; David N. Lawrence et al.,
Insider Trading 2011: How Technology and Social Networks Have ‘Friended’
Access to Confidential Information, KNOWLEDGE@WHARTON, May 11, 2011,
http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article.cfm?articleid=2776 (noting that “the
precise conduct under the definition of insider trading has always been vague”);
Jonathan Macey, Congress’s Phony Insider-Trading Reform, WALL ST. J., Dec.
13, 2011, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405297020341
3304577088881987346976.html?mod=WSJ_Opinion_LEADTop
(describing
current insider trading rules as “broad and vague”) [hereinafter Phony InsiderTrading]; Jonathan Macey, Deconstructing the Galleon Insider Trading Case,
WALL ST. J., Apr. 19, 2011, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB10001424052748704529204576256754289698630.html (observing that “[f]or
decades, the SEC has kept the insider-trading rules vague and undefined.”)
[hereinafter Deconstructing]; Frank C. Razzano, Insider Trading: Ambiguous
Statute as Warning, BLOOMBERG L. REP., June 20, 2011, available at
http://www.pepperlaw.com/publications_article.aspx?ArticleKey=2140.
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Adoption of this materiality guidance would affect the
discretion of enforcement agents in (and judicial review of) insider
trading actions. Accordingly, the remainder of this introduction
lays a foundation for the proposed guidance by describing the
enforcement discretion, judicial deference, and doctrinal contexts
in which the guidance would operate, before establishing a few
premises from this author’s earlier work in which that guidance is
grounded. The article then proceeds (before briefly concluding) to
propose the desired materiality guidance, identify the SEC as the
most appropriate rulemaking body to adopt the guidance, and
suggest a specific form in which the guidance should be issued.
A. A Matter of Enforcement Discretion
The SEC, historically a primary enforcement agent in insider
trading actions, has asserted a strong role in shaping the unsettled
components of insider trading law in the United States. Because
the SEC has enforcement authority and because various aspects of
U.S. insider trading law are susceptible of multiple interpretations,
the SEC can (and does) assess the facts and circumstances of
individual transactions and, after the fact, call some of those
transactions into question by pursuing enforcement activities that
explore and settle open doctrinal questions.9 The SEC is not alone
among enforcement agents in exercising enforcement discretion in
this manner.10 In arguing for more clarity in U.S. insider trading
9. See, e.g., Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983) (in which the SEC
unsuccessfully enforced Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 against a broker-dealer
who traded on material nonpublic information, establishing the elements of
tipper-tippee insider trading liability); SEC v. Cuban, 634 F. Supp. 2d 713 (N.D.
Tex. 2009), vacated and remanded, 620 F.3d 551 (5th Cir. Tex. 2010) (in which
the SEC sought validation of a novel interpretation of the duty of trust and
confidence necessary for insider trading liability); see also Lawrence et al.,
supra note 8 (indicating that the SEC preserves enforcement discretion in the
insider trading context so that it may pick and choose those it may prosecute);
Macey, Deconstructing, supra note 8 (noting that ambiguity in insider trading
rules “increases the SEC’s power and allows government lawyers to pick and
choose among prosecution targets.”).
10. See United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997) (in which the U.S.
Department of Justice successfully prosecuted a lawyer for insider trading on the
basis of his misappropriation of material nonpublic information, validating the
misappropriation theory of insider trading liability); Chiarella v. United States,
445 U.S. 222 (1980) (in which the U.S. Department of Justice’s insider trading
prosecution of a “markup man” at a legal and financial printer was unsuccessful
because of the lack of a requisite duty of trust and confidence, establishing the
classical theory of insider trading liability); see also Macey, Phony InsiderTrading, supra note 8 (noting generally that “prosecutors enjoy almost
unfettered discretion in deciding when and whom to prosecute”).
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regulation, this article addresses an age-old jurisprudential
question: how much enforcement discretion should the law afford
the SEC and other enforcement agents (including the U.S.
Department of Justice and private plaintiffs)?11 Increased ex ante
clarity in insider trading rules affords individual and institutional
actors more certainty in their transactional decision-making but
decreases the capacity for ex post enforcement discretion.
Recent, visible, significant insider trading enforcement and
legislative activity12 makes the issue of enforcement discretion in
insider trading important and timely. Accordingly, this article
addresses one element of enforcement discretion in U.S. insider
trading regulation and offers a solution. Specifically, this article
seeks to identify the appropriate level and type of guidance that
should be provided on the concept of materiality as it is defined
and applied in U.S. insider trading law through the “disclose or
abstain” rule.13 Greater guidance on materiality in the context of
the “disclose or abstain” rule will limit enforcement discretion in
insider trading regulation. However, this more limited discretion
need not compromise the policies underlying U.S. insider trading
regulation. In fact, if properly conceived and crafted (i.e., not as a
bright-line rule, but as a process for decision-making under the
current materiality standard), enhanced materiality guidance
should create a more efficient, and potentially more effective,
system of insider trading regulation consistent with underlying
policy.

11. See generally KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A
PRELIMINARY INQUIRY (1971). Professor Davis writes:
The central inquiry . . . is what can be done to assure that where law
ends tyranny will not begin. More precisely, the central inquiry is what
can be done that is not now done to minimize injustice from exercise of
discretionary power. . . . [W]e should eliminate much unnecessary
discretionary power and . . . we should do much more than we have
been doing to confine, to structure, and to check necessary
discretionary power. The goal is not the maximum degree of confining,
structuring, and checking; the goal is to find the optimum degree for
each power in each set of circumstances.
Id. at 3–4.
12. See SEC Enforcement Actions: Insider Trading Cases, U.S. SEC. &
EXCH. COMM’N, http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/insidertrading/cases.shtml (last
modified Oct. 6, 2011) (“Insider trading continues to be a high priority area for
the SEC’s enforcement program. The SEC brought 53 insider trading cases in
FY 2010 against 138 individuals and entities, a 43 percent increase in the
number of filed cases from the prior fiscal year.”).
13. See infra Parts I.C and II.
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B. A Matter of Deference
In limiting enforcement discretion, materiality guidance also
limits the range of discretion of the federal judiciary in materiality
determinations. As a general matter (although courts apply the
relevant law in various ways), federal courts in the United States
defer to non-arbitrary, non-capricious legislative rulemaking by the
SEC and other agencies if that rulemaking is expressly delegated to
the agency and responds to and is consistent with the applicable
legislative mandate.14 Moreover, where delegation of authority is
not explicit, courts generally will defer to reasonable
administrative agency interpretations of statutory provisions within
the agency’s regulatory mandate.15 Finally, federal courts also
afford deference to a federal agency’s interpretation of its own
regulations.16 If the SEC were to adopt the materiality guidance
proposed in this article, the federal courts may be bound to defer to
the substance of that guidance. In evaluating the agency guidance
proposed for adoption in this article, it is important to assess the
extent to which judicial deference will be afforded to the guidance.
It also is important in this context to determine the status of the
guidance as an agency rule from the standpoint of the U.S.
Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”).17
The APA recognizes a distinction between legislative rules
and interpretative rules. The distinction is one of the most
confusing in all of administrative law because legislative
rules and interpretative rules differ along three different
dimensions: the purpose of the rule, its legal effect, and the
procedures used in promulgating the rule. In terms of
purpose, a legislative rule can be defined as one that
14. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843–844 (1984)
(“If Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, there is an express
delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of the
statute by regulation. Such legislative regulations are given controlling weight
unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute”
(footnote omitted)).
15. See id. at 844 (footnote omitted) (“Sometimes the legislative delegation
to an agency on a particular question is implicit rather than explicit. In such a
case, a court may not substitute its own construction of a statutory provision for
a reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of an agency.”).
16. See Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 413–414
(1945) (“Since this involves an interpretation of an administrative regulation a
court must necessarily look to the administrative construction of the regulation if
the meaning of the words used is in doubt. . . . [T]he ultimate criterion is the
administrative interpretation, which becomes of controlling weight unless it is
plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.”).
17. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559 (2006).
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articulates a new norm or modifies an existing norm,
whereas an interpretative rule interprets or clarifies an
existing norm. In terms of legal effect, a legislative rule is
said to be legally binding on the regulated community the
same way a statute is, while an interpretative rule may bind
agency personnel, but does not bind the regulated
community. In terms of procedure, legislative rules
generally must be promulgated in accordance with public
notice-and-comment procedures, whereas the APA exempts
[interpretive] rules from these procedures. It is easy to see
how the distinction between legislative and interpretative
rules has led to confusion—different courts have
distinguished between these rules on any and all of these
three bases.18
So, is the suggested materiality guidance a legislative rule or an
interpretive rule (a form of nonlegislative rule) under the APA?19
As a general matter, proposed guidance on materiality perhaps
is best seen as an interpretive, rather than legislative, rule under the
APA. However, the materiality guidance proposed in this article
may be seen—or cast—as either a legislative or nonlegislative rule.
It is not intended to provide “a new norm”20 or change “an existing
norm.”21 Rather, it is intended to arrange existing norms into a
more coherent framework for applying the existing materiality
standard as established in decisional law. As a result, the guidance
“interprets or clarifies an existing norm.”22 However, as envisioned
in this article, the proffered materiality guidance—sets of
18. Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO.
L.J. 833, 903 (2001) (footnotes omitted). This explanation is useful (and helpful
here), but it is not the only explanation of the distinction. For example, another
scholar offers the following to explain the difference.
A legislative rule is essentially an administrative statute—an exercise
of previously delegated power, new law that completes an incomplete
legislative design. Legislative rules frequently prescribe, modify, or
abolish duties, rights, or exemptions. In contrast, nonlegislative rules
do not exercise delegated lawmaking power and thus are not
administrative statutes. Instead, they provide guidance to the public and
to agency staff and decisionmakers. They are not legally binding on
members of the public.
Michael Asimow, Nonlegislative Rulemaking and Regulatory Reform, 1985
DUKE L.J. 381, 383 (footnotes omitted).
19. A third possibility should be noted here: that of a policy—another form
of nonlegislative rule. This option is addressed briefly infra note 189 and
accompanying text.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
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alternating presumptions and per se rules addressing two different
factual scenarios—is intended “to be legally binding on the
regulated community the same way a statute”23 that engages those
procedures would be (although it is not common to have statutes
that engage serial presumptions to define an operative term).
Accordingly, the status of the proposed materiality guidance as a
legislative or interpretive rule under the APA is inconclusive.
The way in which the SEC promulgates the guidance may
affect its status as a legislative or interpretive rule.24
When an agency has a choice to proceed legislatively or
nonlegislatively, its contemporaneous description is the most
reliable test of what it actually did. Because an agency can
choose to interpret law or limit discretion through legislative
rulemaking, nonlegislative rulemaking, adjudication, or
other techniques, it is appropriate to accept the agency’s
description of which alternative it chose at the time it made
the choice. Deference to the agency’s label also promotes
certainty and predictability of result and provides agencies
with reasonable assurance that reviewing courts will honor
their decision to proceed nonlegislatively. Thus, an agency’s
contemporaneously-adopted description of its intention and
desired legal effect is and should be of central importance in
characterizing its product.25
Although courts are not bound by the agency’s description of its
own rule as legislative or nonlegislative, that description can be
helpful guidance to the court in exercising its decision-making
authority.26
SEC interpretive guidance on materiality should be given
deference by the federal courts, whether it is viewed as a
legislative rule or an agency interpretation of the congressional or
SEC rules embodying U.S. federal insider trading prohibitions.
Congress delegated broad express authority to the SEC to make
rules under Section 10(b) (“Section 10(b)”) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, as amended (the “1934 Act”).27 These rules
23. Id.
24. See Asimow, supra note 18, at 389 (“In many instances, an agency can
choose to proceed legislatively or nonlegislatively, and there can be little dispute
over the characterization of the resulting product: The agency explicitly declares
that it intends to act either legislatively or nonlegislatively and that declared
intention corresponds with the legal effect of the rule.”).
25. Id. at 389–90 (footnotes omitted).
26. See id. at 390.
27. 15 U.S.C. § 77j(b) (2006) (making it unlawful “[t]o use or employ, in
connection with the purchase or sale of any security . . . any manipulative or
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are the foundation for most U.S. federal insider trading
regulation.28 Adding detail to the judicially constructed definition
of materiality in a manner that better effectuates the purpose of
insider trading regulation under Section 10(b) and related SEC
rulemaking is neither arbitrary nor capricious and, by its nature,
would be consistent with both the statutory provision and SEC
rulemaking under the statute, as interpreted in decisional law.
Federal courts should give effect to the SEC’s views on the
application of materiality doctrine because it represents expert
guidance on existing law and rules within the SEC’s area of
authority.
While federal court deference to SEC guidance on materiality
constrains the freedom of judicial decision-making in materiality
determinations, constraint is part of Congress’s statutory plan, in
which it expressly delegated implementation of Section 10(b) to
the SEC in the statute.29 This judicial deference to SEC guidance
on materiality, like the limitation on enforcement discretion
resulting from that guidance, need not compromise the policies
underlying U.S. insider trading doctrine and holds the promise of
creating a more efficient, and potentially more effective, system of
regulation that is consistent with underlying policy.
C. The Relevant Legal Doctrine: “Disclose or Abstain” and
Materiality
The judge-made “disclose or abstain” rule is the substantive
focal point of U.S. insider trading regulation30 under Rule 10b-5,31
the principal anti-fraud rule adopted by the SEC under Section

deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations
as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public
interest or for the protection of investors” (emphasis added)).
28. See infra Part I.C.
29. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
30. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Insider Trading under the Restatement of
the Law Governing Lawyers, 19 J. CORP. L. 1, 4 (1993) (“The so-called disclose
or abstain rule is the basic federal insider trading prohibition.”); Donna M.
Nagy, The “Possession vs. Use” Debate in the Context of Securities Trading by
Traditional Insiders: Why Silence Can Never be Golden, 67 U. CIN. L. REV.
1129, 1129 (1999) (“For more than thirty-eight years, the so-called ‘disclose or
abstain’ rule has been an integral part of the insider trading prohibition imposed
by the federal securities laws.”).
31. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2012). The SEC has adopted two additional
insider trading rules under its authority to make rules implementing Section
10(b): Rules 10b5-1 and 10b5-2. 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.10b5-1 & 240.10b5-2.
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10(b) (“Rule 10b-5”).32 The “disclose or abstain” rule provides that
when an issuer of publicly traded securities33 or one of its
insiders34 is in possession of undisclosed material information, the
issuer or insider must either disclose the material information
before trading in the issuer’s securities or abstain from trading in
the issuer’s securities.35 Most insider trading claims are raised
under Rule 10b-5 and involve the application and interpretation of
this rule.36 Although the materiality of undisclosed information is
quite clear in some cases; in others, materiality is contestable and
may be determinative. It is this latter class of cases that motivates
this article.
The concept of materiality, which is central to the “disclose or
abstain” rule,37 is defined by use of a broad, judicially constructed
32. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b).
33. Publicly traded securities, for these purposes, are securities that are
registered under Section 12 of the 1934 Act. 15 U.S.C. § 78l.
34. In general, an “insider” is an individual or entity that has a relationship
of “trust and confidence” with the issuer’s shareholders. Chiarella v. United
States, 445 U.S. 222, 228 (1980).
35. See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 30, at 4 (“A trader who possesses
material, nonpublic information must either disclose it to the investment public
before trading, or if he is unable to do so, must abstain from trading in the
affected company’s securities.”); Jesse M. Fried, Insider Abstention, 113 YALE
L.J. 455, 456 (2003) (“Under the duty to disclose or abstain, a person in
knowing possession (or ‘aware’) of material nonpublic information must either
disclose the information or abstain from trading when the other party to the
transaction is entitled to know the information because of a fiduciary duty or
other relationship of trust and confidence between them.”); Lynn A. Stout, The
Unimportance of Being Efficient: An Economic Analysis of Stock Market
Pricing and Securities Regulation, 87 MICH. L. REV. 613, 623 (1988) (“Federal
law prohibits insiders from trading on the basis of nonpublic information not
disclosed to the person with whom they are trading.”).
36. See Fried, supra note 35, at 456 (“The primary mechanism for
regulating insider trading is the duty to ‘disclose or abstain,’ which arises under
Rule 10b-5 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.”). A violation of Section
10(b) requires manipulative or deceptive conduct. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b).
Contravention of the “disclose or abstain” rule constitutes the requisite
deception. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Insider Trading Regulation: The Path
Dependent Choice Between Property Rights and Securities Fraud, 52 SMU L.
REV. 1589, 1615 (1999) (“[I]nsider trading in violation of the disclose or abstain
rule involves an element of deception.”); Samuel W. Buell, What Is Securities
Fraud?, 61 DUKE L.J. 511, 562 (2011) (“The insider trading prohibition is often
described as a ‘disclose or abstain’ rule because there is no deception, and thus
no fraud, if the seller/buyer tells her counterparty about the particular inside
information she uses to trade.”).
37
“The sine qua non of any insider trading claim is material nonpublic
information.” Bradley J. Bondi & Steven D. Lofchie, The Law of Insider
Trading: Legal Theories, Common Defenses, and Best Practices for Ensuring
Compliance, 8 N.Y.U. J. L. & BUS. 151, 154 (2011).
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standard.38 Specifically, under Rule 10b-5 (both within and outside
of the insider trading context), a fact is material when there is a
substantial likelihood that (a) a reasonable investor would find the
fact important in making an investment decision or (b) disclosure
of the fact would significantly alter the “total mix” of publicly
available information.39 In the context of preliminary merger
discussions, where consummation of the subject merger is
uncertain, a more tailored test exists, in which the probability of
the potential transaction occurring is weighed against the
magnitude of the potential transaction.40 This balancing test is
widely applied by courts, litigants, and other actors in other
circumstances involving the disclosure or nondisclosure of current
facts relating to contingent or speculative events.41 These facially
simple articulations of a materiality standard make for difficult ex
ante and ex post materiality determinations in many cases and
allow for the exercise of significant enforcement discretion and
hindsight bias by enforcement agents and judicial decisionmakers.42
In an earlier article (the “Initial Materiality Article”), this
author argued for additional substantive guidance for making

38. See Charles M. Yablon & Jennifer Hill, Timing Corporate Disclosures
to Maximize Performance-Based Remuneration: A Case of Misaligned
Incentives?, 35 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 83, 107 (2000) (“[T]he materiality
concept speaks broadly to require disclosure of any information that a
‘reasonable shareholder’ would consider ‘important.’”).
39. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231–32 (1988) (applying,
under Rule 10b-5, the alternative materiality formulations endorsed by the Court
in TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976)).
40. Id. at 239.
41. See, e.g., City of Philadelphia v. Fleming Cos., 264 F.3d 1245, 1265 (10th
Cir. 2001) (assessing the materiality of pending litigation); United States SEC v.
Fehn, 97 F.3d 1276, 1291 (9th Cir. 1996) (regarding the materiality of contingent
liabilities); PPM Am. v. Marriott Corp., 853 F. Supp. 860, 868 (D. Md. 1994)
(governing the materiality of a “major change in corporate form”); Wielgos v.
Commonwealth Edison Co., 688 F. Supp. 331, 343 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (determining
the materiality of a licensing board’s determination regarding an operating permit).
The Basic Court expressly disclaimed that its adoption of the balancing test for the
purpose of assessing the materiality of preliminary merger discussions constituted
a broader adoption of the test for use in other circumstances involving contingent
or speculative events. Basic, 485 U.S. at 232 n.9.
42. See Mitu Gulati et al., Fraud by Hindsight, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 773, 774
(2004) (“Hindsight blurs the distinction between fraud and mistake. People
consistently overstate what could have been predicted after events have unfolded
. . . .”). Some judges disclaim that their materiality determinations are being
made with the benefit of hindsight. See id. at 809.
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materiality determinations in the insider trading context.43 The
argument for change set forth in that article is based on both
underlying policy and related shareholder value considerations,44
although other rationales for additional materiality guidance in
various stock-trading contexts also have been advanced. For
example, arguments for enhancing materiality guidance under
Regulation FD45 tend to focus on the fact that the lack of guidance
fosters nondisclosure in circumstances where disclosure should be
encouraged.46 Professor Steve Schwarcz effectively argues that the
ambiguity in materiality determinations causes a temporal problem
in that it forces corporations contemplating disclosure to choose
between the maximization of short-term shareholder value and the
maximization of long-term shareholder value.47 Professor James
Park argues that imprecision in the existing qualitatively oriented
materiality standard “expands the potential cost of defending
securities fraud actions relating to accounting misstatements,
especially for companies when they are issuing securities.”48
Professor Steven Davidoff similarly proclaims that materiality is
outdated and lacking in current investor relevance.49 Finally,
accountants argue that the lack of a concrete definition of
materiality creates undesirable behavioral effects.50
43. Joan MacLeod Heminway, Materiality Guidance in the Context of
Insider Trading: A Call for Action, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 1131 (2003) (reprinted at
36 SEC. L. REV. 448 (2004)).
44. See id. at 1140–43 (summarizing these arguments); Donald C.
Langevoort, Editor’s Introduction, 36 SEC. L. REV. 20 (2004) (noting the
argument that ambiguity in the materiality standard used in insider trading
regulation “is not necessary to promote the underlying policy goals of the insider
trading prohibition and the uncertainty negatively impacts shareholder value”).
45. 17 C.F.R. § 243.100–103 (2012).
46. Laura Unger, Commissioner, Special Study: Regulation Fair Disclosure
Revisited, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (December 2001), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/regfdstudy.htm (last modified Oct. 29, 2003).
47. Steven L. Schwarcz, Temporal Perspectives: Resolving the Conflict
Between Current and Future Investors, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1044 (2005).
48. James J. Park, Assessing the Materiality of Financial Misstatements, 34
J. CORP. L. 513, 531 (2009).
49. Steven M. Davidoff, In Corporate Disclosure, a Murky Definition of
Material, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK, April 5, 2011, http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/
04/05/in-corporate-disclosure-a-murky-definition-of-material/
(“[T]he
current
disclosure scheme and its definition of materiality . . . is increasingly disconnected
from the desires of investors and the marketplace. . . . The definition of materiality is
from the 1980s, another time.”).
50. See Andrew A. Acito et al., Materiality Decisions and the Correction
of Accounting Errors, 84 ACC’TING REV. 659, 660 (2009) (“The absence of
bright-line criteria means that some materiality decisions may be strategic in
their purpose”); see also id. at 664 (“Because GAAP does not provide brightline rules for determining materiality, management and auditors must jointly
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These issues with the current materiality standard are
particularly troublesome in the context of insider trading.
[T]he concept of materiality as implemented in U.S. insider
trading regulation has created unique planning problems for
public companies and their insiders. This unique effect
results from the fact that the judicially ordained law of
insider trading in the United States acts as a transactional
disclosure rule that, unlike other disclosure rules under the
federal securities laws, provides issuers and their insiders
with no specific disclosure content guidance.51
The open-textured disclosure environment of insider trading in
which materiality operates is of particular concern when it mixes
with enforcement discretion. Enforcement agents may exercise
their discretion to enforce insider trading prohibitions against some
buyers, sellers, tippers, or tippees—and not others—for reasons
unrelated to the policy objectives underlying insider trading
regulation. For example, the SEC and other public enforcement
agents may conduct their activities in part to develop the law of
materiality.52 Also, in an earlier work, this author noted that the
vagueness of aspects of the legal standard for insider trading
liability under Rule 10b-5 (including the materiality element),
when paired with the broad enforcement discretion available in the
insider trading enforcement process, invites the introduction of

negotiate a subjectively determined . . . materiality assessment on a case-by-case
basis. This approach leaves open the possibility that some assessments are
opportunistic and designed to achieve financial reporting and disclosure
goals.”).
51. Heminway, supra note 43, at 1135. See also Peter J. Henning, Insider
Trading Riddle: Why Do the Rich Risk It?, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK, Apr. 4,
2012, http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/04/04/insider-trading-riddle-why-dothe-rich-risk-it/?ref=securitiesandexchangecommission (identifying materiality
as a key component of U.S. insider trading regulation).
52. See, e.g., Bondi & Lofchie, supra note 37, at 200 (“Because the law has
developed in the courts . . . insider trading law is fluid and continues to evolve as
markets grow, technology changes, and the DOJ and SEC press new theories of
insider trading.”); David L. Kornblau & Brian B. Alexander, Recent Developments
in the Law of Insider Trading and Material Nonpublic Information, SIFMA
Compliance & Legal Society 2011 Annual Seminar (March 7, 2011), at 9,
available at http://www.cov.com/files/Publication/5bd8d976-2faa-490a-86a1ac2265dd9bc4/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/cbc992cb-aa02-42d1-95a9b019dc56ede3/Recent%20Developments%20in%20the%20Law%20of%20Insider
%20Trading%20and%20Material%20Nonpublic%20Information.pdf (noting that
“the SEC continues to push the envelope of materiality in its insider trading
program”).
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enforcement biases.53 In general, enforcement agents believe it is
in their best interest to preserve discretion by leaving materiality
and other key concepts and terms vague and by self-defining these
words and terms to suit their needs as the time arises. In
commenting on a recent case, Professor Peter Henning aptly
summarizes the relationship between the SEC and enforcement
discretion relating to materiality in the context of mergers and
acquisitions:
The S.E.C. takes an aggressive view of materiality. . . . It
has avoided drawing any clear lines around what is—and is
not—material information about mergers and acquisitions
because that might encourage trading by those who learn
about a potential deal in the early stages. For the S.E.C., all
information is potentially material, and a flexible approach
is in its interest.54
The relationship between unclear regulation and enforcement
discretion is advantageous to federal agencies charged with
enforcing the law in the areas of regulatory mandate. It allows
enforcement agents to use enforcement as a regulatory tool. As a
result, the desire for broad enforcement discretion is not unique to
insider trading regulation or the SEC.55 The obvious benefit of
53. Joan MacLeod Heminway, Save Martha Stewart? Observations About
Equal Justice in U.S. Insider Trading Regulation, 12 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 247
(2003).
54. Peter J. Henning, The Materiality of Merger Negotiations, N.Y. TIMES
DEALBOOK, Apr. 4, 2011, http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/04/04/themateriality-of-merger-negotiations/.
55. See, e.g., John Ashcroft & John Ratcliffe, The Recent and Unusual
Evolution of an Expanding FCPA, 26 NOTRE DAME J. L. ETHICS & PUB POL’Y
25, 34 (2012) (“[E]ven the most basic elements of the FCPA, like what
constitutes a ‘bribe’ or who is considered a ‘foreign official,’ remain largely
undefined. As a result, it would appear that prosecutors are unfettered in their
discretion to extend the boundaries of FCPA interpretation to fit the facts and
circumstances of any particular investigation.”); John S. Baker, Jurisdictional
and Separation of Powers Strategies to Limit the Expansion of Federal Crimes,
54 AM. U.L. REV. 545, 570 (2005) (“Congress has left great discretion to the
Executive in prosecution by enacting broad and often ambiguous criminal
statutes.”); Michael S. Kelley, “Something Beyond”: The Unconstitutional
Vagueness of Rico’s Pattern Requirement, 40 CATH. U.L. REV. 331, 392 (1991)
(“RICO’s pattern requirement threatens fifth amendment freedoms by
combining an ambiguous term with a statute granting tremendous discretion to
prosecutors and private plaintiffs.”); Joan H. Krause, Medical Error as False
Claim, 27 AM. J. L. & MED. 181, 197 (2001) (“The current health care
regulatory environment is characterized by ambiguous rules that do not
adequately address the realities of the health care market, relying on
prosecutorial discretion to distinguish improper activities from harmless (or
even efficient) behavior.”); Michael J. Malinowski, Globalization of
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enforcement discretion in this context is that it affords enforcement
agents the opportunity to mold their enforcement strategies and
efforts to fit new, unforeseen factual contexts.
It is possible for an enforcement agent to have too much
discretion, however. More is not necessarily better. The Initial
Materiality Article raises questions in this regard based on
shareholder value considerations.56 Vagueness in applied
materiality doctrine may also raise other economic efficiency
concerns and may weaken, rather than strengthen, the deterrence
value of the regulatory regime.57 While some efficient, desirable
securities transactions will go forward despite the risk of potential
enforcement, many will be discouraged by that risk. An efficacious
insider trading regime under current U.S. law should enable

Biotechnology and the Public Health Challenges Accompanying It, 60 ALB. L.
REV. 119, 169 (1996) (“[A]ccording to some accounts, FDA officials have all
the power and discretion they need, and this discretion is enhanced by the
ambiguity of the regulations they enforce.”).
56. See Heminway, supra note 43, at 1172–90.
57. Various scholars have written on this point. I will share the thoughts of
two here. Professor Marlene O’Connor notes that
a specific rule enhances the efficiency of a deterrence strategy in two
ways. First, precise regulations have an impact on the cost side of the
potential violator’s risk-reward equation. Because a specific rule
employs very few factual issues to determine whether certain activity is
illegal, it increases the likelihood that the defendant’s conduct will fall
within its narrow parameters and thus be deemed illegal. In addition,
because a specific rule does not provide for discretionary exceptions, it
also raises the probability that the defendant will be convicted for
engaging in the illegal activity. Second, a specific rule reduces the
amount of resources the enforcement system consumes in prosecuting
violators. A precise rule promotes deterrence and decreases the number
of violations that occur; thus it lowers the amount of resources required
for the detection of the illegal activity and the total number of cases
brought before the judicial system. Specific regulation also conserves
judicial resources, because cases concerning a specific rule involve
only a few factual issues that take less time to litigate. Given only a
limited number of facts to dispute, parties can more accurately predict
the outcome of litigation; thus, a specific rule also increases the
likelihood that parties will settle their disputes outside the court system.
Marleen A. O’Connor, Toward a More Efficient Deterrence of Insider Trading:
The Repeal of Section 16(b), 58 FORDHAM L. REV. 309, 359 (1989) (footnotes
omitted). Professor Dru Stevenson raises a similar point, noting that “[w]hen
people feel the law or sanctions are not just unknown, but unknowable, they will
either be overly cautious and reclusive (avoiding too many useful activities) due
to the ‘chilling effect,’ or overly careless about the consequences of their
actions, creating significant externalities for society.” Dru Stevenson, Toward a
New Theory of Notice and Deterrence, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 1535, 1547–1548
(2005).
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enforcement against those in positions of trust and confidence who
desire to misuse significant, market-relevant information by
appropriating it for personal benefit rather than releasing it to the
market—no more, no less. When the breadth of enforcement
discretion creates collateral damage (in terms of economic
inefficiencies, deterrence failures, or otherwise) and that
enforcement discretion can be constrained without compromising
the efficacy of the scheme of regulation, then rule makers should
consider placing appropriate limits on enforcement discretion.58
D. Decreasing Enforcement Discretion Through Materiality
Guidance
While a bright-line materiality definition would certainly cabin
enforcement discretion in insider tradition regulation (and be a
likely candidate for judicial deference), this article does not argue
for a bright-line rule. Instead, this article contends that materiality
guidance can be formulated based on a series of presumptions
derived from existing decisional law, agency pronouncements, and
scholarly commentary. Although this article offers guidance only
in two common insider trading scenarios, similar guidance could
be constructed over time to address other facts and circumstances
giving rise to potential insider trading claims. The overall idea is to
provide individuals who possess material nonpublic information in
a duty-bound context with more certain, predictable, consistent
instructions on how to conduct their trading activities—activities
that may contribute to healthy, efficient capital markets. Currently,
these desirable trading activities may be avoided in an abundance
of caution.59
The Initial Materiality Article proposes a method for
constructing the desired materiality guidance.60 This proposal
required that the proponent of the guidance: (1) isolate factual
circumstances in the insider trading context in which materiality
guidance routinely is needed; (2) identify the elements of
materiality that are operative under those circumstances and the
ways in which the materiality of each element is measured (based
58. Accord Ashcroft & Ratcliffe, supra note 55, at 34 (“While it is
understood that laws are rarely black and white, our adversarial system of justice
is not well served when the roles of prosecutor and judge are combined, and
where the resulting law remains perpetually gray. For corporate America, the
dilemma is obvious—it is difficult for any company to ensure that its employees
and business partners will act ethically and legally when it is unclear which
actions will trigger [a] . . . violation.”).
59. See Heminway, supra note 43, at 1174–77.
60. Id. at 1193.
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on the applicable legal standard and existing line-item disclosure
rules and decisional law); and (3) incorporate each materiality
element and measurement technique into guidance on materiality
applicable to the isolated factual circumstances.61
The Initial Materiality Article leaves two important items for
future resolution, however. First, it does not resolve which federal
rulemaking institution would or should adopt specific proposals for
materiality guidance in the insider trading context, stating that
“[w]hether that guidance comes in the form of legislation, SEC
rulemaking, SEC interpretive advice, or (at a bare minimum) more
methodical, rigorous decision-making in the courts, enhanced
guidance is warranted.”62 In fact, the Initial Materiality Article
expressly indicates that this question of comparative institutional
choice could be resolved in a separate scholarly work.63
Accordingly, in a subsequent article (the “Institutional Choice
Article”), this author began to take on that task by proposing a
standardized framework for making comparative institutional
choice decisions in federal corporate governance rulemaking
(including insider trading rulemaking).64 This framework involves
comparative institutional analyses in four separate areas:
institutional capacity—power, authority, and jurisdiction;65
structural and substantive institutional competence;66 institutional
influence and bias;67 and pecuniary cost.68 The Institutional Choice
Article does not expressly address, however, the application of the
suggested framework to a specific proposal for additional guidance
on materiality in insider trading law.
Second, largely because the Initial Materiality Article does not
resolve essential issues of comparative institutional choice, it fails
to recommend the specific type and content of the proposed
enhanced materiality guidance. Instead, using the method it
outlines, the Initial Materiality Article suggests the possible
substantive and procedural contents of materiality guidance in two
sets of factual circumstances: irregularities in balance sheet
accounting and failed merger discussions.69 These suggestions
61. Id.
62. Id. at 1191–92.
63. Id. at n.219.
64. Joan MacLeod Heminway, Rock, Paper, Scissors: Choosing the Right
Vehicle for Federal Corporate Governance Initiatives, 10 FORDHAM J. CORP. &
FIN. L. 225 (2005).
65. Id. at 248–62.
66. Id. at 262–307.
67. Id. at 307–32.
68. Id. at 332–48.
69. Heminway, supra note 43, at 1199–1210.
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require refinement, enhancement, and institutional packaging
before they can constitute formal proposals for legal change.
This article engages in that refinement, enhancement, and
institutional packaging, and in the process, makes certain
adjustments to the guidance proposed in the Initial Materiality
Article. This article also both analyzes and determines the
appropriate rulemaking body and proposes the form in which the
materiality guidance should be adopted and published. To
accomplish these objectives, the article proceeds in four additional
parts. Part II summarizes, clarifies, and modifies the approaches to
materiality guidance on balance sheet irregularities and failed
merger discussions that are suggested in the Initial Materiality
Article. Specifically, Part II describes detailed processes through
which materiality can be assessed by relevant actors ex ante and ex
post in two common factual circumstances (balance sheet
irregularities and failed merger discussions). Part III then presents
a comparative institutional analysis, as outlined in the Institutional
Choice Article, with respect to the proposed materiality guidance
and concludes that the SEC or, failing that, the courts should adopt
that guidance. As a result of this outcome of the comparative
institutional analysis, Part III concludes by describing the current
political and economic environment in which the SEC is operating.
Part IV describes the form of a proposed SEC interpretive release
to implement that guidance, and Part V summarizes and briefly
concludes.
II. FURTHER GUIDANCE ON MATERIALITY IN INSIDER TRADING
REGULATION
The Initial Materiality Article features difficult, indeterminate
materiality analyses in two common factual contexts and suggests
possible structures for enhanced guidance in those two contexts.
This Part reintroduces those examples and the related guidance
structures. The guidance structures are expressly intended to
enable transaction planners,70 litigants, and their counsel, as well as
enforcement officials and members of the judiciary, to make
materiality assessments in the two exemplar areas with a higher
level of certainty. If the guidance is effective, costs incident to
70. In the Initial Materiality Article, this term is defined to include “any
issuer of securities, any insiders of that issuer, and their respective advisors on
any transaction at issue, including without limitation legal counsel.” Id. at 1137
n.19. Importantly, the Initial Materiality Article and this article both include
issuers, as well as directors, officers, and others with a relevant duty of trust and
confidence in the class of potential violators of insider trading law.
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making materiality determinations should be reduced, vexatious
litigation challenging materiality determinations should be filed
less frequently, and if a specious case hinging on materiality is
brought, it should be decided more easily on a motion to dismiss or
for summary judgment.71 It is important to note, however, that the
rules and presumptions comprising this guidance are intended as
advice and assistance to transaction planners and others, rather
than (necessarily) as determinants of legal liability. However, it
also is important to note that the presumptions in the guidance are
crafted to be within, rather than at the edge of, the range of legal
compliance. Insider trading compliance plans, for example, are
similarly crafted to be within the range of legal compliance.72
The proffered guidance may be adopted by the federal courts,
Congress, or the SEC—all of which are insider trading rule
makers. But adoption of materiality guidance through the judicial
process would occur incrementally through decisional law over
time (much as it has in the past). The appropriate rule maker for
and nature of the guidance will be addressed in detail in Part III.
However, it is worth noting here (in evaluating the propriety and
efficacy of the substance of the guidance as set forth in this Part)
that the choice of rule maker may render the proposed guidance
more or less feasible and more or less legally binding on the
potential actors ab initio and over time.
A. Improper Balance Sheet Accounting
The first exemplar factual context in the Initial Materiality
Article involves a public company’s reckless financial statement
error—the understatement of balance sheet reserves, resulting in a
corresponding two percent overstatement of assets.73 Before the
error is expressly identified and corrected in public filings, the
public company’s Chief Financial Officer exercises stock options
and sells the underlying shares. In this example, there exists a
concern that the Chief Financial Officer may have been in
possession of material nonpublic information—the true (lower)
value of the corporation’s assets—at the time she sold her shares
into a public market that then had no awareness of the lower asset
71. Of course, in any given case, other elements of an insider trading claim
also may be at issue.
72. See generally Joan T.A. Gabel et al., Letter vs. Spirit: The Evolution of
Compliance into Ethics, 46 AM. BUS. L.J. 453, 462 (2009) (describing insider
trading compliance programs); Steven Chasin, Comment, Insider v. Issuer:
Resolving and Preventing Insider Trading Compliance Policy Disputes, 50
UCLA L. REV. 859, 861-64 (same).
73. See Heminway, supra note 43, at 1145–46.
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valuation. In this manner, she would be deemed to have profited
personally from the nondisclosure of the adverse corporate
financial information.
Having presented this example, the Initial Materiality Article
proceeds to determine that a materiality analysis based on these
facts does not result in a clear conclusion. Then, it outlines and
applies a recommended approach to fashioning more specific
materiality guidance applicable to these (and other similar) facts.
The application of this approach results in the suggestion that
materiality guidance on improper balance sheet accounting,
could be constructed so that it: (i) renders per se material
all asset or liability omissions or misstatements in amounts
exceeding ten percent of an issuer’s total consolidated
assets (taken individually or collectively for any given
reporting period), based on the most recently reported
balance sheet of the issuer; (ii) presumes material all asset
or liability omissions or misstatements in amounts
exceeding five percent (but not in excess of ten percent) of
an issuer’s total consolidated assets (taken individually or
collectively for any given reporting period), based on the
most recently reported balance sheet of the issuer (which
presumption is rebuttable by the trading issuer or insider
based on a list of specified factors derived from current law
and regulation); and (iii) presumes immaterial all asset or
liability omissions or misstatements in amounts equal to or
less than five percent of an issuer’s total consolidated assets
(taken individually or collectively for any given total
reporting period), based on the most recently reported
balance sheet of the issuer (which presumption is rebuttable
by an investor plaintiff or prosecutor based on a list of
specified factors derived from current law and
regulation).74
This suggestion was intended to provide a basic framework for
guidance, but the numerical thresholds at five percent and ten
percent of total consolidated assets are at odds with accounting
convention (which is relevant, although not dispositive, to the legal
assessment of materiality). While income threshold tests for
materiality typically hover in this range,75 asset tests tend to be set
74. Id. at 1203–04.
75. See Seong-Yeon Cho et al., Measuring Stockholder Materiality, ACCT.
HORIZONS 63, 64 (2003 Supp.) (“Items less than 5 percent of net income are
generally considered immaterial, while items greater than 10 percent are
considered material.”); Mark W. Nelson et al., The Effect of Quantitative
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at significantly lower thresholds—more in the order of one-half
percent of net assets. Investor tolerance for materiality may,
however, be lower.76
The Initial Materiality Article assumed that there was no
significant income statement effect caused by the improper balance
sheet accounting example presented.77 This assumption and the
related focus on an asset-oriented test for materiality prove to be
faulty from an accounting point of view. For accountants,
quantitative materiality typically is gauged by reference income
statement data, first and foremost, although asset tests may be
employed in specific circumstances (including where assets are a
better point of reference because of the nature of the corporation or
its financial statements).78 That being the case, the suggested
materiality guidance in the Initial Materiality Article should be recast to focus on income statement thresholds. Accordingly, this
article re-proposes the suggested guidance for improper balance
sheet accounting. Specifically, materiality guidance on improper
balance sheet accounting could be constructed to: (i) render per se
material all misstatements (taken individually or collectively for
any given reporting period) in excess of ten percent of the issuer’s
net income before taxes, based on the most recently reported
income statement of the issuer; (ii) presume material all
misstatements (taken individually or collectively for any given
reporting period) of at least five percent, but not in excess of ten
percent, of the issuer’s net income before taxes, based on the most
recently reported income statement of the issuer (which
presumption is rebuttable by the trading issuer or insider based on
a list of specified factors derived from current law, regulation, and
guidance); and (iii) presume immaterial all misstatements (taken
individually or collectively for any given total reporting period) of

Materiality Approach on Auditors’ Adjustment Decisions, 80 ACCT. REV. 897, 900
(2005) (“[Q]uantitative thresholds such as 5–10 percent of net income have long
been used in practice”); James Brady Vorhies, The New Importance of Materiality,
J. OF ACCT. (May 2005), available at http://www.journalofaccountancy.com/
Issues/2005/May/TheNewImportanceOfMateriality.htm (“Working materiality
levels or quantitative estimates of materiality generally are based on the 5% rule,
which holds that reasonable investors would not be influenced in their investment
decisions by a fluctuation in net income of 5% or less.”).
76. See Cho et al., supra note 75, at 65 (“We infer from our results that the
average investor materiality threshold for pretax earnings is between 0.1 percent
and 0.2 percent. For total assets, we estimate a materiality threshold between
0.01 percent and 0.025 percent.”).
77. See Heminway, supra note 43, at n.246.
78. See WILLIAM F. MESSIER ET AL., AUDITING AND ASSURANCES: A
SYSTEMATIC APPROACH 87 (6th ed. 2007).
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less than five percent of the issuer’s net income before taxes, based
on the most recently reported income statement of the issuer
(which presumption is rebuttable by the trading issuer or insider
based on a list of specified factors derived from current law,
regulation, and guidance).
Overall, this guidance represents a more concrete way to
approach the problem of financial statement misstatements and is
not inconsistent with the SEC’s Staff Accounting Bulletin: No. 99 –
Materiality.79
The use of a percentage as a numerical threshold, such as
5%, may provide the basis for a preliminary assumption
that—without considering all relevant circumstances—a
deviation of less than the specified percentage with respect
to a particular item on the registrant's financial statements
is unlikely to be material. The staff has no objection to such
a “rule of thumb” as an initial step in assessing
materiality.80
The reformulated materiality guidance suggested in this article
accepts the concept of a rule of thumb for quantitative measures
materiality and provides a specific process for how qualitative
factors can then be assessed given those accounting industry
norms. The reformulated guidance, however, leaves undetermined
the referenced lists of applicable rebuttal factors, the applicable
standards of proof on rebuttal, and the procedural effects of a
rebuttal that satisfies the applicable standards of proof.81 These
matters are addressed in the remainder of Part II.A.
1. Rebuttal Factors
Based on existing administrative and judicial pronouncements
and scholarly commentary, the factors set forth below may rebut a
presumption of materiality in the event of asset misstatements that

79. SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 99, 64 Fed. Reg. 45,150 (Aug. 19,
1999) [hereinafter SAB No. 99]. SAB No. 99 is a publication of the SEC’s staff
that does not represent formal guidance from the SEC but it is used by the SEC
in its work and is given significant, but not dispositive, weight by the judiciary,
legal advisors, and transaction planners. See Bondi & Lofchie, supra note 37, at
181 (“Although the SEC often cites SAB 99 in its pleadings, the bulletin is not
the adopted view of the SEC (i.e., the Commission has not voted on it). It is
merely an official interpretation of the staff and, therefore, should not be given
undue authoritative weight.”).
80. SAB No. 99.
81. See infra Parts II.A.1 & II.A.2.
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cause a change of at least five percent, but not in excess of ten
percent, in an issuer’s net income before taxes:
• the action (tipping or trading) of the issuer or insider is
counterintuitive to the misstatement (i.e., the misstatement
results in a decrease in net income before taxes and the
issuer or insider acquires shares before the misstatement is
publicly announced, or the misstatement results in an
increase in net income and the issuer or insider sells shares
before the misstatement is publicly announced);82
• net income before taxes is not a significant factor in market
assessments of the issuer’s operations or financial condition
because of, for example, the nature of the issuer’s
business;83
• the misstatement relates to a business segment or other
portion of the issuer’s business that plays an insignificant
role in the issuer’s operations or financial condition; 84
• the misstatement arises from an estimate that is inherently
imprecise at the order of magnitude of the
misrepresentation;85 and
• the misstatement results from calculations or measurements
that, although made with reasonable care, are widely
known to be, or that have been disclosed by the issuer to
be, subject to inaccuracies of the type and amount exhibit
in connection with the issuer’s misstatement.86
These factors collectively call into question both the relevance and
the reliability of a misstatement that appears to be, in relative
82. Victor Brudney, A Note on Materiality and Soft Information Under the
Federal Securities Laws, 75 VA. L. REV. 723, 737 (1989) (“[W]hen an insider is
buying, projections, asset appraisals, or pending merger negotiations that
suggest an increase in the price of a corporation’s stock are likely to be of more
interest to the rational public transactor than unfavorable projections or asset
appraisals. And when the insider is selling, the undisclosed unfavorable
information about future prices is likely to be of more interest to the rational
public transactor than undisclosed favorable information.”).
83. See supra note 78 and accompanying text (noting that, while income
tests are the norm for quantitative materiality assessments, asset tests or other
benchmarks for quantitative materiality may be used where the validity of an
income test is questionable).
84. Cf. SAB No. 99, supra note 79 (suggesting that the opposite—“whether
the misstatement concerns a segment or other portion of the registrant’s business
that has been identified as playing a significant role in the registrant’s operations
or profitability”—may render a small deviation material).
85. Cf. id. (“whether the misstatement . . . arises from an estimate and, if so,
the degree of imprecision inherent in the estimate”).
86. Cf. id. (“whether the misstatement arises from an item capable of
precise measurement”).
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terms, quantitatively large.87 Relevance and reliability are
important components of materiality analysis.88
Factors that may rebut a presumption of immateriality in the
event of asset misstatements that cause a change of less than or
equal to five percent in an issuer’s net income before taxes include
the following:
• the misstatement relates to a business segment or other
portion of the issuer’s business that is significant to the
issuer’s operations or financial condition;89
• the misstatement arises from an estimate that is inherently
imprecise at the order of magnitude of the
misrepresentation;90
• the misstatement hides a change in earnings or other income
statement effect, especially one that changes income into a
loss or a loss into income;91
• the misstatement hides the issuer’s failure to meet publicly
available financial statement targets (whether published by
the issuer or third parties);92
• the misstatement hides illegal activity;93
• the misstatement hides or constitutes regulatory
noncompliance;94
• the misstatement hides or constitutes the breach of a
“material contract;”95
87. See Brudney, supra note 82, at 728–32.
88. Id. at 731 (identifying and defining relevance and reliability as key
overarching factors in materiality analysis).
89. See SAB No. 99, supra note 79 (suggesting consideration of “whether
the misstatement concerns a . . . portion of the registrant’s business that has been
identified as playing a significant role in the registrant's operations or
profitability”).
90. See id. (“whether the misstatement . . . arises from an estimate and, if
so, the degree of imprecision inherent in the estimate”).
91. See id. (suggesting consideration of “whether the misstatement masks a
change in earnings or other trends” and “whether the misstatement changes a
loss into income or vice versa”). The use of reserve account estimates as a way
of adjusting earnings across financial statement periods is a well-known
accounting technique. See LAWRENCE A. CUNNINGHAM, INTRODUCTORY
ACCOUNTING, FINANCE AND AUDITING FOR LAWYERS 438 (4th ed. 2002)
(describing “Cookie Jar Reserves”).
92. See SAB No. 99, supra note 79 (suggesting consideration of “whether
the misstatement hides a failure to meet analysts’ consensus expectations for the
enterprise”).
93. See id. (suggesting consideration of “whether the misstatement involves
concealment of an unlawful transaction”).
94. See id. (suggesting consideration of “whether the misstatement affects
the registrant’s compliance with regulatory requirements”).
95. Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.601(b)(10) (2012) (defining material
contracts for purposes of SEC exhibit requirements); see SAB No. 99, supra
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the misstatement is of a kind and magnitude that financially
benefits the issuer or its directors, officers, or other managers
at the expense of the issuer’s shareholders, including by
increasing the directors’, officers’, or managers’ actual, or
potential future, compensation;96
• the misstatement evidences a lack of management
integrity;97
• the accounting error that resulted in the misstatement
evidences a material weakness in internal controls;98 and
• the misstatement is persistent (not an isolated event).99
The general approach recommended here employs both
quantitative and qualitative materiality doctrine consistent with
existing SEC guidance100 and related scholarly commentary.101 The
accounting literature and ever-evolving decisional law should be
evaluated for additional rebuttal factors on a periodic basis.102
•

note 79 (suggesting consideration of “whether the misstatement affects the
registrant’s compliance with loan covenants or other contractual requirements”).
96. See SAB No. 99, supra note 79 (suggesting consideration of “whether
the misstatement has the effect of increasing management’s compensation—for
example, by satisfying requirements for the award of bonuses or other forms of
incentive compensation”).
97. See, e.g., In re Franchard Corp., 42 S.E.C. 163 (1964); see also SEC v.
Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co., 452 F. Supp. 824, 830 (E.D. Wis. 1978); John M.
Fedders, Qualitative Materiality: The Birth, Struggles, and Demise of an
Unworkable Standard, 48 CATH. U. L. REV. 41, 46–47 (1998) (recounting the
history of qualitative materiality doctrine); Amy Deen Westbrook, Sunlight on
Iran: How Reductive Standards of Materiality Excuse Incomplete Disclosure
Under the Securities Laws, 7 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 13, 30–34 (2011) (recounting
the history of management integrity issues and materiality doctrine).
98. A material weakness is “a deficiency, or a combination of deficiencies, in
internal control over financial reporting . . . such that there is a reasonable
possibility that a material misstatement of the registrant’s annual or interim
financial statements will not be prevented or detected on a timely basis.” 17 C.F.R.
§ 210.1-02(a)(4) (2012). Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 focused
attention on mandatory disclosures about internal controls in periodic reports filed
under the 1934 Act. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 404,
116 Stat. 745, 777–78 (2002) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7262 (2006)).
99. See Park, supra note 48, at 518 (suggesting, similarly, that “evidence of
a persistent misstatement might create a rebuttable presumption of materiality
while evidence that the misstatement is isolated might create a rebuttable
presumption of immateriality.”); id. at 550–52 (expanding on the presumption
suggestion).
100. See SAB No. 99, supra note 79.
101. See Park, supra note 48, at 565 (characterizing his own proposal as “a
firmer basis for distinguishing the financial misstatements that matter”).
102. See, e.g., MESSIER ET AL., supra note 78, at 86 (listing possible rebuttal
factors in Table 3-5, many of which parallel those in SAB No. 99, supra note 79).
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2. Standard of Proof and Procedural Effects
A transaction planner using the proposed materiality guidance
on improper balance sheet accounting will want to consider the
standards to be applied in his, her, or its decision-making and the
standards that may be used to evaluate his, her, or its decisionmaking ex post, even if the guidance is offered in the form of
legislation or agency rulemaking. This involves identifying and
taking into account the standards of proof in civil and criminal
insider trading actions and the procedural effects of those
standards.
An analysis of the standard of proof applicable to rebuttals of
the presumptions and the effect of successful rebuttals requires
understanding the application and operation of presumptions and
rebuttals in the context of a court action. The standards of proof
provide guidance to decision-makers in using the proposed
materiality guidance and also frame potential court analyses if the
court should be required, or otherwise determine, to adopt the
guidance in evaluating the conduct of alleged insider traders.
Courts have different ways of looking at rebuttable
presumptions in civil cases. Specifically, they
differ as to the effect that a presumption must be given in a
civil action and the burden it imposes on the party opposing
it. There are three different approaches taken by the courts .
. . . One imposes only a burden of production or going
forward with evidence to rebut the presumption. The
second approach requires a more substantial burden of
proof requirement. The third approach uses both the burden
of production and burden of proof.103
Which of the three approaches seems most appropriate in
connection with the presumptions that operate in the proposed
materiality guidance on improper balance sheet accounting?
The plaintiff in a civil action must prove materiality by a
preponderance of the evidence. Is it sufficient, where an omission
or misstatement is presumed to be material, that the defendant
present evidence that a rebuttal factor exists to overcome the
presumption, or should the defendant be required to prove the
existence of that factor by a preponderance of the evidence? And is
it sufficient, where an omission or misstatement is presumed to be
immaterial, that the plaintiff present evidence that a rebuttal factor
exists, or should the plaintiff be required to prove the existence of
that factor by a preponderance of the evidence? Finally, should
103. THOMAS BUCKLES, LAWS OF EVIDENCE 56 (2001).
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both presumptions be treated the same way, given that the burden
of proof is on the plaintiff in a civil action?
Because the policies underlying the alternating presumptions in
the proposed guidance on improper balance sheet accounting
represent a careful balancing of interests (rather than a unilateral,
fundamental determination to favor one party over another in
insider trading litigation), the rebutting party in a civil case also
should have to establish the rebuttal facts by a preponderance of
the evidence. Accordingly, the establishment of any single rebuttal
factor by a preponderance of the evidence removes the applicable
presumption of materiality or immateriality, leaving the case to a
determination at trial based on all available evidence appropriately
brought before the court—with the plaintiff continuing to bear the
burden of proof. The inability of a party to assert, in good faith, the
existence of any rebuttal factor enables—but does not mandate—a
trier of fact to find facts consistent with the presumption (i.e.,
against the party entitled to rebut the presumption). In the rare case
that a rebutting party is able to establish one or more rebuttal
factors by clear and convincing evidence, the trier of fact may
determine that the rebuttal is compelling enough to find facts
contrary to the presumption. Accordingly, putative rebutters should
secure and preserve any evidence relating to the rebuttal of an
operative presumption and should evaluate proposed action based
on the weight of that evidence.
The application of a per se rule (also known as a conclusive or
mandatory presumption) or rebuttable presumption in a criminal
proceeding is not as straightforward as the application of a per se
rule or rebuttable presumption is in a civil proceeding and may
raise constitutional issues. Although a thorough analysis of these
issues is beyond the scope of this article, it is important to say a
few words about their relevant components at this juncture.
Under criminal law principles, as even non-lawyers know, a
defendant is innocent until proven guilty. Criminal actions require
proof beyond a reasonable doubt of each element of the crime.
Accordingly, conclusive and rebuttable presumptions of any
element necessary to establish a criminal violation are scrutinized
carefully for their effects on the burden of proof.
A mandatory presumption is a . . . troublesome evidentiary
device. For it may affect not only the strength of the “no
reasonable doubt” burden but also the placement of that
burden; it tells the trier that he or they must find the
elemental fact upon proof of the basic fact, at least unless
the defendant has come forward with some evidence to
rebut the presumed connection between the two facts. In
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this situation, the Court has generally examined the
presumption on its face to determine the extent to which the
basic and elemental facts coincide. To the extent that the
trier of fact is forced to abide by the presumption, and may
not reject it based on an independent evaluation of the
particular facts presented by the State, the analysis of the
presumption’s constitutional validity is logically divorced
from those facts and based on the presumption’s accuracy
in the run of cases. It is for this reason that the Court has
held it irrelevant in analyzing a mandatory presumption,
but not in analyzing a purely permissive one, that there is
ample evidence in the record other than the presumption to
support a conviction.104
The presumptions suggested in the proposed materiality
guidance on improper balance sheet accounting would be “merely
a part of the prosecution’s case”105 giving “rise to a permissive
inference available only in certain circumstances . . . that . . . could
be ignored by the jury even if there was no affirmative proof
offered . . . in rebuttal.”106 Assuming that the trier of fact
understands or is instructed that there is a mandatory presumption
of innocence in favor of the defendant “that controls unless it, as
the exclusive trier of fact, is satisfied beyond a reasonable
doubt”107 the facts at issue are material, the suggested
presumptions should pass constitutional muster.
However, the per se materiality rule raises constitutional
questions in criminal actions. Under the proposed guidance, all
asset or liability omissions or misstatements that cause a change of
more than ten percent in the issuer’s net income before taxes, are
material. This rule would act as a conclusive (mandatory)
presumption if introduced in a criminal action. Accordingly, the
per se rule should not operate in criminal actions as a conclusive
presumption. Rather, the per se rule should operate as a permissive
presumption in that context.
A permissive presumption allows but does not require the
jury to infer the elemental fact upon proof of the basic
facts. It does not relieve the government of its burden of
persuasion because the government still must convince the
jury that the suggested conclusion should be inferred
104. County Court v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 157–160 (1979) (citations and
footnotes omitted).
105. Id. at 160.
106. Id. at 161.
107. Id. at 162.
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based on the predicate facts proved. The use of a
permissive presumption is constitutional so long as there
is a “rational connection” between the predicate and
presumed facts. . . .108
The establishment of a general per se rule in the proposed
guidance (and its operation as a permissive, but non-rebuttable,
presumption in the hands of the trier of fact in a criminal action)
offers a strong, clear message to transaction planners: proceed very
cautiously, if at all, in buying, selling, or selectively disclosing.
B. Failed Merger Discussions
The second exemplar factual context presented in the Initial
Materiality Article involves open-market purchases of shares by a
public company issuer’s directors five to six months after the
issuer’s rejection of a series of undisclosed acquisition proposals at
premium prices. Within one month after the directors’ share
acquisitions, the putative acquirer discloses the earlier acquisition
offers (in turn, driving up the market price of the issuer’s stock)
and makes a successful cash tender offer to acquire the issuer at a
significant premium to the prices paid by the directors.109 The
insider trading question in these circumstances emanates from a
concern that the directors may have possessed material nonpublic
information—knowledge of the existence and terms of the earlier
acquisition proposals—when they bought their shares from sellers
in the public market that had no knowledge of those acquisition
proposals.
As with the first exemplar factual context, the second exemplar
factual context does not admit to a simple application of existing
formulations of the materiality standard. Among the difficulties are
determining whether the specialized “probability versus
magnitude” balancing test announced in Basic v. Levinson is
applicable on these facts and deciding when, if ever, nonpublic
information regarding acquisition proposals is so distant in time
that it is immaterial as a matter of law. The materiality analysis and
the application of the suggested approach to determining

108. Hill v. Maloney, 927 F.2d 646, 649 (1st Cir. 1990); see also Norvell v.
Miller, 476 U.S. 1126, 1127–28 (1986).
109. See Heminway, supra note 43, at 1146–48; see also Evelyn M. Rusli,
After Deal Talks Sputter, Alibaba and Yahoo Said to Meet Again, N.Y. TIMES
DEALBOOK, March 20, 2012, http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/03/20/afterdeal-talks-sputter-alibaba-and-yahoo-meet-again/ (describing recent deal talks
involving similar facts).
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materiality guidance in this area led to a preliminary conclusion
that
it may then be sufficient to adapt disclosure guidelines that
label an acquisition proposal as (a) per se material during
the time it is actively being considered and for three months
or six months after it is withdrawn, rejected, or abandoned,
(b) presumed material after that three-month or six-month
period until two years have passed since the withdrawal,
rejection, or abandonment of the proposal (which
presumption is rebuttable by the issuer or insider based on a
list of specified factors derived from current law and
regulation), and (c) presumed immaterial after two years
have passed since the withdrawal, rejection, or
abandonment of the proposal (which presumption is
rebuttable by an investor plaintiff, or prosecutor based on a
list of specified factors derived from current law and
regulations).110
This suggested guidance, in the form proposed in the Initial
Materiality Article, is incomplete because the term “acquisition
proposal” is undefined and because the proposed guidance fails to
choose between the potentially applicable three-month and sixmonth periods as the tipping point between per se materiality and
presumed materiality.111 Moreover, rulemaking since the
publication of the Initial Materiality Article may call into question
the two-year period suggested in the proposed guidance;
accordingly, this author revisited the presumption of immateriality
that attaches after two years.112 Finally, the guidance proposed in
the Initial Materiality Article leaves open the referenced lists of
applicable rebuttal factors for the presumptions, the applicable
standards of proof on rebuttal of the presumptions, and the
procedural effects of a rebuttal of the presumptions that satisfies
the applicable standards of proof.113 These items are addressed in
the remainder of this Part.
1. Defining “Acquisition Proposal”
The suggested guidance in the Initial Materiality Article
addresses, through alternating presumptions, the decreased
probability that an acquisition of the target actually will occur
110.
111.
112.
113.

Heminway, supra note 43, at 1211.
See infra Parts II.B.1 & II.B.2.
See infra Part II.B.3.
See infra Parts II.B.4 & II.B.5.
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following earlier, spurned acquisition proposals. Under the Basic v.
Levinson “probability versus magnitude” formulation of the
materiality standard,114 as the probability of occurrence of a
specific contingent or speculative event decreases, the obligation to
disclose present facts relating to that event will decrease. But at all
steps along the way, the probability of the future event occurring is
weighed against the significance of the event. In defining
“acquisition proposal,” the guidance instructs transaction planners
and others in assessing the significance of the future transaction for
the purpose of assessing its magnitude.
The Basic Court reminds us that mergers in which a target
corporation is not the survivor are important transactions to the
target because the transaction terminates the target’s corporate
existence.115 But mergers also may be important to the survivor as
well as the target, and other types of transactions (including
acquisitions) may, depending on the key terms of the transaction
(e.g., whether all or a significant part of the corporation is affected,
the proposed pricing of the transaction as compared to prevailing
and historical market prices, and other transaction terms), be
important to an issuer or have an impact on the total mix of
information available to those trading in the issuer’s stock at any
given time.116 So, the “acquisition proposal” definition must
encompass both the type of transaction and its basic terms: the
object of acquisition, price, type of consideration, availability of
consideration (financing for cash or debt, authorized shares for
equity), etc.
The “acquisition proposal” definition also must describe the
stage of the interactions between the parties. The Basic case itself
and the failed merger discussions example used in the Initial
Materiality Article both address a pre-consensus stage in the
discussions of a business combination transaction.117 But there can
be many pre-consensus phases of a transaction, each having a
different relevance.118 The definition must differentiate among
them as part of the materiality assessment.
114. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 238–39 (1988); Heminway,
supra note 43, at 1163–64.
115. Basic, 485 U.S. at 238 (citing SEC v. Geon Industries, Inc., 531 F.2d
39, 47–48 (2d Cir. 1976)).
116. See id. at 239 (advising attention to “such facts as the size of the two
corporate entities and of the potential premiums over market value.”).
117. See id. (“No particular event or factor short of closing the transaction
need be either necessary or sufficient by itself to render merger discussions
material.”).
118. See generally In re George C. Kern, Jr., Admin. Proc. File No. 3–6869,
[1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 84,142 (June 29, 1987) (in
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Accordingly, it is important to define the concept of an
“acquisition proposal” so that corporations and their insiders know
when and what to disclose, and to do that, the definition must be
broad. Current mandatory disclosure rules again provide assistance
and support in constructing the definition. Existing line-item
disclosure rules require disclosure of various abandoned and
ongoing change of control and business combination transactions
in connection with purchases and sales of securities (the same
circumstances under which Rule 10b-5 is operative). For example,
an issuer engaging in an issuer tender offer must
describe any plans, proposals or negotiations that relate to
or would result in . . . any extraordinary transaction, such as
a merger, reorganization or liquidation, involving the
subject company or any of its subsidiaries; [or] . . . any
purchase, sale or transfer of a material amount of assets of
the subject company or any of its subsidiaries.119
Similarly, a third-party tender offeror must disclose
any negotiations, transactions or material contacts during
the past two years between the filing person [offeror] . . .
and the subject company [target] or its affiliates concerning
any (1) merger; (2) consolidation; (3) acquisition; (4)
tender offer for or other acquisition of any class of the
subject company’s securities; (5) election of the subject
company’s directors; or (6) sale or other transfer of a
material amount of assets of the subject company.120
Contracts—especially merger agreements—also circumscribe
acquisition proposals for the purpose of identifying the obligations,
rights, and remedies of the parties to the agreement in the event
that an alternative transaction is presented to one of the parties
after the contract is signed and before the closing has occurred.
Two commentators described a provision of this kind in a
particular merger agreement (the “Stone-EPL Agreement”).

which the difference between “discussions” and “negotiations” was important in
determining disclosure obligations); see also Steven G. Sanders, Comment,
Line-Item Disclosure Provisions and the Materiality of Preliminary Merger
Negotiations After In re George C. Kern, Jr., 59 BROOK. L. REV. 175, 224–25,
227 (1993).
119. 17 C.F.R. § 229.1006(c)(1)–(2) (2012) (referenced in Item 6 of
Schedule TO).
120. 17 C.F.R. § 229.1005(b) (incorporated into Item 5 of Schedule TO).
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The Stone-EPL Agreement defined third-party acquisition
proposal as “‘an inquiry, offer or proposal’ . . . in which the
third party would acquire 30% or more of EPL.”121
Contract definitions like this one abound in merger and acquisition
agreements and take various forms. For example, a recent merger
agreement that used the term (as it commonly is used) in no-shop,
non-solicitation, and change of recommendation provisions
defined the term this way:
An “Acquisition Proposal” shall mean any proposal or offer
. . . for (i) a merger, reorganization, share exchange,
consolidation, business combination, joint venture,
partnership, recapitalization, dissolution, liquidation or
similar transaction involving Company and/or any
Subsidiary or Subsidiaries of the Company whose business
or businesses constitute twenty-five percent (25%) or more
of the assets, revenues or earnings of Company and its
Subsidiaries, taken as a whole, (ii) an acquisition of assets
of Company and/or its Subsidiaries equal to twenty-five
percent (25%) or more of the consolidated assets of
Company and its Subsidiaries or to which twenty-five
percent (25%) or more of Company’s revenues or earnings
on a consolidated basis are attributable (iii) an acquisition
of 25% or more of the outstanding Company Common
Stock, or (iv) a tender offer or exchange offer that, if
consummated, would result in any person or “group” (as
defined under Rule 13(d) of the Exchange Act) beneficially
owning 25% or more of the outstanding Company
Common Stock.122
Another recent merger agreement took a different approach,
separating the acquisition proposal definition from a definition of
an acquisition transaction.
. . . “Acquisition Proposal” shall mean any offer or
proposal (other than an offer or proposal made or submitted
by Parent or any of its Subsidiaries) contemplating or
otherwise relating to any Acquisition Transaction.
121. Amy Y. Yeung & Charles B. Vincent, Delaware’s “No-Go” Treatment
of No-Talk Provisions: Deal-Protection Devices after Omnicare, 33 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 311, 317 (2008).
122. Agreement and Plan of Merger, Parlux Fragrances, Inc., Perfumania
Holdings, Inc., and PFI Merger Corp., December 23, 2011, § 5.3(i), available at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/880460/000088046011000020/ex21the
mergeragreement.htm.
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. . . “Acquisition Transaction” shall mean any transaction or
series of transactions (other than the Merger) involving:
(a) any merger, consolidation, amalgamation, share
exchange, business combination, joint venture, issuance
of securities, acquisition of securities, reorganization,
recapitalization, tender offer, exchange offer or other
similar transaction: (i) in which a Person or “group” (as
defined in the Exchange Act and the rules thereunder)
of Persons directly or indirectly acquires beneficial or
record ownership of securities representing 20% or
more of the outstanding securities of any class (or
instruments convertible into or exercisable or
exchangeable for 20% or more of any such class) of the
Company Common Stock; or (ii) in which the
Company issues securities representing 20% or more of
the outstanding securities of the Company (or
instruments convertible into or exercisable or
exchangeable for 20% or more of any such class);
(b) any sale, exchange, transfer, acquisition or
disposition of the equity securities of any business or
businesses that constitute or account for 20% or more
of the consolidated net revenues, consolidated net
income or consolidated assets of the Company;
(c) any sale, lease, exchange, transfer, license,
sublicense, acquisition or disposition of the assets of
any business or businesses that constitute or account for
20% or more of the consolidated net revenues,
consolidated net income or consolidated assets of the
Company; or
(d) any liquidation or dissolution of the Company.123
A combination of the ideas in the two different tender offer
disclosures and the contract-based definitions, as well as common
legal and practical knowledge, creates a comprehensive definition
of “acquisition proposal” for use in materiality guidance in this
area. An acquisition proposal exists with respect to a particular
issuer when there are plans, proposals, negotiations, transactions,
or similar contacts between the issuer and an affiliated or
unaffiliated third party concerning any:
• election of the issuer’s directors;
• dissolution or liquidation of the issuer;
123. Agreement and Plan of Merger, Ebay Inc., Gibraltar Acquisition Corp.,
and GSI Commerce, Inc., March 27, 2011, at Exhibit A, available at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1065088/000119312511082907/dex21.
htm.
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merger, consolidation, statutory share exchange,124
amalgamation, tender offer (or other share purchase),
exchange offer, acquisition of assets, other business
combination, recapitalization, reorganization, joint venture,
partnership, or similar transaction that results in the
issuance, conversion, or exchange of a significant
percentage of the outstanding securities of any class of the
issuer’s securities or that impacts a significant percentage
of the assets, revenues, or earnings of the issuer and its
subsidiaries (if any), taken as a whole;
• tender offer for or other acquisition of a significant
percentage of any class of the issuer’s securities by the
third party; or
• sale, exchange, transfer, license, sublicense, divestiture, or
other disposition of a significant percentage of assets of the
issuer.
Significant percentage may be defined as a specific percentage
(e.g., 20% or 25%, as it is in the merger agreement example) or it
may be left undefined (providing less definitive guidance to the
putative actors).
Given the per se materiality component of the recommended
materiality guidance, the word “inquiry” was omitted from the
definition because its use would cause a mere inquiry about a
transaction—regardless of its magnitude to the issuer—to be
material under the per se part of the proposed guidance. That result
would appear to disrespect the Court’s guidance on balancing
probabilities and magnitudes in Basic125 (since a mere inquiry
about a transaction indicates a low probability that the transaction
will occur) and would be unduly burdensome for transaction
planners. The word “material” as used in other definitions also was
omitted in favor of other methods of indicating significance. This
was done to avoid using the concept of materiality to define
materiality in the broader context.
•

2. Per se Materiality Period
Based on current trends in U.S. securities regulation, the
applicable per se materiality period should be six months. The
Initial Materiality Article noted two touchstones for the threemonth or six-month period separating per se materiality from
124. This business combination transaction is available in states adopting the
Revised Model Business Corporation Act. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 11.03
(2002).
125. See supra text accompanying notes 40–41.
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presumed materiality: the three-month affiliate rule then included
in Rule 144(k) under the 1933 Act126 and the six-month strict
liability profit disgorgement rule of Section 16(b) of the 1934
Act.127 The more conservative six-month period is more closely
tied to the policy underpinnings of U.S. insider trading regulation.
Since the Initial Materiality Article was published, Rule 144
has been amended (in 2007, effective in 2008) to delete former
Rule 144(k) and replace it with three-month requirements in Rule
144(b)(1)(i) and (ii).128 This requirement, together with the 90-day
affiliate references in Rule 144(b)(2) relating to the ability of
affiliates to be deemed underwriters and create underwriter status
in others,129 indicates that periods of approximately three months
may be appropriate benchmarks for SEC and public concerns
about the use of nonpublic information by affiliates in the public
markets. It appears the SEC has determined that after three months,
the salience of an affiliate’s information has dissipated to the point
that all relevant constituencies should be content to treat the
affiliate as if he or she were a non-affiliate.
The six-month short-swing-profit disgorgement provision
remains the same as it was when the Initial Materiality Article was
published. This time period, which is part of an insider trading
prohibition, may be seen as more directly applicable to materiality
analyses than the three-month affiliate rules in Rule 144 under the
1933 Act. Although the six-month period used in Section 16(b) is
widely criticized in the strict liability context of that rule, the
period does have some basis as a measuring device in insider
trading deterrence.130 “Congress apparently believed that the six126. Heminway, supra note 43, at 1210.
127. Id. at 1210–11.
128. 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(b)(1) (2012); see also U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N,
Revisions to Rules 144 and 145, Securities Act Release No. 8869, 92 SEC
Docket 110 (Dec. 6, 2007), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2007/338869.pdf [hereinafter Rule 144 Release].
129. 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(b)(2).
130. See generally Merritt B. Fox, Insider Trading Deterrence Versus
Managerial Incentives: A Unified Theory of Section 16(b), 92 MICH. L. REV.
2088 (1994) (asserting that the six-month period in Section 16(b) discourages
insider trading by forcing insiders to hold onto securities under circumstances in
which they might otherwise trade sooner). Professor Jesse Fried notes that
Section 16(b) . . . is still believed to serve three useful purposes: (1) it
reduces insiders’ ability to profit from short-term stock price
fluctuations, better enabling them to focus their attention on the longterm performance of the firm; (2) it makes it more difficult for insiders
to exploit Rule 10b-5’s limitations by unfairly using sub-material inside
information; and (3) it reduces insiders’ incentives to manipulate the
information transmitted by the corporation in order to make short-term
trading profits.
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month period would capture virtually all transactions in which
there might be an opportunity to profit from the use of inside
information.”131 Moreover, director and officer insiders under
Section 16(b), unlike affiliates under Rule 144, remain restricted in
their trading for up to six months after their insider status
terminates (until six months after an opposite trade made before
termination of director or officer status).132 These six-month
periods evidence decreased concern on the part of Congress and
the SEC that information gained from privileged positions is
important after six-months has passed.
Six-month rules of thumb in U.S. securities regulation are
prevalent (though not always fully explainable or defensible). The
2007 amendments to Rule 144 shortened the holding period for
resales of restricted securities of public company issuers (reporting
issuers, for purposes of the 1934 Act) to as little as six months, as
long as certain other requirements, including the public
information requirements in Rule 144(c)(1), have been met).133
Also, certain offers or sales of securities made within six months of
each other are presumptively integrated for purposes of exemptions
and safe harbors from registration under Rule 147,134 Regulation
D,135 and Regulation A.136 Although these rules have little to do
with the relative staleness of information acquired by corporate
affiliates or insiders, each is a rule that engages temporal proximity
to identify (among other things) the proper mix of available
information that should be considered when determining the
required disclosure of a particular matter (here, an offering of

Jesse M. Fried, Reducing the Profitability of Corporate Insider Trading Through
PreTrading Disclosure, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 303, 362 (1998).
131. Michael H. Dessent, Weapons to Fight Insider Trading in the 21st
Century: A Call for the Repeal of Section 16(b), 33 AKRON L. REV. 481, 497
(2000) (footnote omitted); see also Joel Seligman, The Reformulation of Federal
Securities Law Concerning Nonpublic Information, 73 GEO. L.J. 1083, 1111
(1985) (“The legislative history emphasized the need to renew investors
confidence in the exchange markets by deterring profitable short swing trading
by insiders or large stockholders presumed to have access to inside
information.”).
132. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.16a-2(b)(1) (“A transaction . . . following the
cessation of director or officer status shall be subject to section 16 of the Act
only if: (1) Executed within a period of less than six months of an opposite
transaction subject to section 16(b) of the Act that occurred while that person
was a director or officer. . . .”).
133. 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(d)(1)(i).
134. 17 C.F.R. § 230.147(b)(2) (referencing Preliminary Note 3).
135. 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(a).
136. 17 C.F.R. § 230.251(c)(2)(v).
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securities). The materiality component of U.S. insider trading
regulation functions much the same way—as a filtering device for
information required to be disclosed before an insider may engage
in a trading transaction.137
3. Two-year Presumptive Immateriality Period
The Initial Materiality Article identifies a number of bases for
the conclusion that disclosures relating to prior acquisition
proposals become stale under mandatory disclosure rules after two
years.138 These bases remain firm almost ten years later.
However, advances in information technology continue to
shorten time frames relevant to mandatory disclosure. In particular,
as noted with respect to the three-month-versus-six-month analysis
in Part II.B.2 above, required holding periods under Rule 144 have
been getting progressively shorter. Specifically, the holding period
for restricted securities held by non-affiliates was reduced from
two years to one year.139 Rule 144 provides that specified sellers of
securities will not be deemed to be underwriters of those securities
for purposes of the exemption under Section 4(1) of the 1933
Act,140 a safe harbor from underwriter status. This provision relies
on, among other things, the length of time that a person holds
securities acquired from the issuer or one of its affiliates—i.e., the
length of time that the security has been held by a non-insider.
Accordingly, the shorter time periods under Rule 144 may indicate
that the two-year rules of thumb relied upon in the Initial
Materiality Article’s analysis also should be shortened.

137. See Heminway, supra note 43, at 1149–50 (analogizing materiality to
the Hogwarts Sorting Hat from the Harry Potter books).
Materiality is the Sorting Hat embedded in many disclosure rules under
the federal securities laws, including the “disclose or abstain” rule that
operates in the area of securities fraud, including insider trading
regulation. Where there is a duty to disclose a material fact, whether in
accordance with mandatory disclosure rules or anti-fraud rules, the
materiality of that particular fact determines whether an individual or
entity is obligated to disclose that fact. Either the fact is material and
must be disclosed, or it is not material and need not be disclosed. Stated
differently, where materiality is used to qualify a disclosure obligation,
it is a key device that sorts information required to be disclosed from
that which is not required to be disclosed.
Id. at 1149 (footnotes omitted).
138. Id. at 1206−08.
139. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(b)(1); see also Rule 144 Release, supra note
128.
140. 15 U.S.C. 78d(1) (2006).
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In a recent action asserting a violation of Section 5 of the 1933
Act, a defendant made a similar argument that did not prevail.141
The court noted, among other things, that Rule 144 provides
“safeguards for investors” that do not exist outside its purview that
contribute to the rationale for a shorter period.142 Given this result,
even taking into account that rebuttal factors may act as important
investor safeguards, this author is hesitant to propose varying the
two-year period suggested in the Initial Materiality Article. Yet,
two years after withdrawal, rejection, or abandonment of an
acquisition proposal is a long time. Are there any reasons why the
fact of an acquisition proposal would be material after two years
(including at least one full audit cycle)? This author can conceive
of only a few circumstances, all of which are outlined in Part II.B.4
below. Materiality would be rare in these circumstances.
Given the narrow scope of potential materiality of an
acquisition proposal two years after its withdrawal, rejection, or
abandonment, it seems appropriate to consider whether a per se
immateriality rule for the period beginning two years after the
withdrawal, rejection, or abandonment of an acquisition proposal is
more appropriate than a presumption of immateriality. Although
this idea is appealingly simple, this author has two principal
reservations about proposing this change. First, guidance that
institutes per se immateriality discourages the kind of rigorous
thinking about the market-importance of information that the
materiality requirement encourages. Instead, a per se immateriality
rule would act as a black-line materiality rule that allows bad
actors a means of constructing avenues for opportunistic, selfserving behaviors. Second, as a related, more specific point, I am
concerned that the notion of per se immateriality in insider trading
disclosure guidance might be inappropriately imported to other
disclosure contexts in which fraud protection in general (and
materiality as an element of a fraud claim in particular) provides an
important check on and enhancement to mandatory disclosure (in
the form of either line-item or gap-filling rules).143 For example,
Rule 10b-5 compels disclosure of material facts “necessary in
order to make the statements made, in the light of the

141. S.E.C v. Big Apple Consulting USA, Inc., No. 6:09-CV-1963-ORL28GJK, 2011 WL 3753581, at *7−8 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 25, 2011).
142. Id at *8.
143. See Heminway, supra note 43, n.240 (describing the over-inclusiveness
and under-inclusiveness of mandatory disclosure rules, including line-item and
gap-filling rules).
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circumstances under which they were made, not misleading.”144
Accordingly, the proposed guidance does not include a per se
immateriality rule for the period beginning two years after the
withdrawal, rejection, or abandonment of an acquisition proposal.
4. Rebuttal Factors
As noted earlier in this Part II.B,145 the materiality guidance on
failed merger discussions proposed in the Initial Materiality Article
includes shifting presumptions as to materiality (starting six
months after withdrawal, rejection, or abandonment of the
acquisition proposal) and immateriality (starting two years after
withdrawal, rejection, or abandonment of the acquisition
proposal).146 As was true for the presumptions suggested for use in
the proposed materiality guidance on improper balance sheet
accounting, the presumptions suggested regarding failed merger
discussions are rebuttable based on evidence cutting against the
presumed conclusion. Accordingly, rebuttal factors relating to the
presumption that facts relating to an acquisition proposal are
material between six months and two years after the withdrawal,
rejection, or abandonment of that acquisition proposal include the
following facts and circumstances:
• the offeror made a single acquisition proposal that never
matured into discussions or negotiations;
• the issuer has had no contact with the offeror since the
withdrawal, rejection, or abandonment of the proposal;
• based on publicly available information, the transaction that
is the subject of the proposal is no longer possible;
• publicly available market-based or third-party valuations of
the issuer (including the issuer’s per-share or aggregate
market capitalization) exceed the value represented by the
withdrawn, rejected, or abandoned offer and the issuer is
not otherwise a prime target for a third-party acquisition;
and
144. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2012). See also Heminway, supra note 43, at
1170−71 (“[I]n requiring the complete and accurate disclosure of material facts
in specific contexts, anti-fraud rules act as gap-filling disclosure rules.”).
145. See supra Parts II.B.2 & II.B.3.
146. The author notes here, with respect to the two parenthetical expressions
in this sentence, that it may not be easy to determine, in some factual
circumstances, when an acquisition proposal is withdrawn, rejected, or
abandoned. The guidance proposed here and in the Initial Materiality Article is
not intended to create bright line rules that create absolute certainty for the
parties on all possible facts. Rather, they are designed to diminish uncertainty to
transaction participants to achieve greater efficiencies.
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the issuer is not in the market for a transaction substantially
similar to, or with attributes substantially similar to, the
transaction that was the subject of the acquisition proposal.

Factors rebutting the presumption that facts relating to an
acquisition proposal are immaterial when two years have passed
since the withdrawal, rejection, or abandonment of the proposal
include the converse of those listed for presumed materiality. A
withdrawn, rejected, or abandoned acquisition proposal may be
material more than two years later if
• the acquisition proposal had been particularly welldeveloped before its withdrawal, rejection, or
abandonment;
• there has been continued contact between the parties since
the withdrawal, rejection, or abandonment of the
acquisition proposal;
• the transaction that was the subject of the acquisition
proposal is still possible;
• the acquisition proposal valuation of the target exceeds
other available valuations; or
• the issuer is in the market for a transaction substantially
similar to, or with attributes substantially similar to, the
transaction that was the subject of the acquisition proposal,
especially if the non-issuer party is the only (or one of a
few) possible transaction partners.
Arguably, materiality would be rare but still possible in these
circumstances. The last rebuttal factor is the most powerful of
those listed and should carry the most weight in decision-making.
In some cases, however, the total mix of information in the
marketplace may include substantially all of the information that is
important in making an investment decision. That assessment
would need to be made at the time of the proposed purchase or sale
or information transfer that could give rise to insider trading
liability. Said differently, under many circumstances, it would be
improbable that there would be a substantial likelihood that the
reasonable investor would find that a failure to disclose the
acquisition proposal would be important or would significantly
alter the total mix of available information.147 The proposed
guidance here does not change those general touchstones of
materiality law in the insider trading context. It merely affords

147. See generally Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 224 (1988) (citing
TSC Indus. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976), for this “total mix
formulation” of the materiality standard).
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better ex ante certainty for transaction planners and narrows ex
post enforcement discretion.
5. Standard of Proof and Procedural Effects
The standard of proof applicable to rebuttals of the
presumptions and the effect of successful rebuttals is no different
for the failed merger discussions example than it is for the
improper balance sheet accounting example in civil actions.148 A
rebutting party should have to establish the rebuttal factors in a
civil case by a preponderance of the evidence. As described above,
this means that the establishment of any of the rebuttal factors by a
preponderance of the evidence leaves the case to a judicial
determination at trial based on all available evidence appropriately
brought before the court, and the inability of a party to assert in
good faith the existence of any rebuttal factor enables a trier of fact
to find facts consistent with the presumption.
However, the proposed guidance for failed merger discussions,
like the improper balance sheet accounting guidance, includes a
conclusive (mandatory) presumption: the per se materiality rule for
an acquisition proposal during the time it is actively being
considered and for six months after it is withdrawn, rejected, or
abandoned. Handling this as a permissive (non-rebuttable)
presumption, as proffered for the per se materiality rule for
improper balance sheet accounting,149 should obviate constitutional
concerns while at the same time powerfully guiding the actions of
transaction planners and other actors who would turn to the
proposed materiality guidance for advice and assistance in making
materiality determinations in the insider trading context.
III. CHOOSING THE RIGHT RULEMAKING INSTITUTION
Having fleshed out the substance of proposed materiality
guidance for circumstances involving both improper balance sheet
accounting and failed merger discussions, the article now proceeds
to determine the rulemaking institution that should adopt this
guidance. Because the guidance is a federal corporate governance
initiative, three choices emerge: the federal courts, the U.S.
Congress, and the SEC. As previously noted, the Institutional
Choice Article provides a framework for making this kind of
comparative institutional choice.150 The discussion and analysis in
148. See supra Part II.B.2.
149. See supra text accompanying note 108.
150. See supra text accompanying note 64.
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this Part employ that framework and provide a basis for concluding
that the SEC is the most appropriate institutional body to adopt the
proposed materiality guidance. Because application of the
framework shows that the SEC may be the best institution for
adopting the proposed materiality guidance, this Part concludes
with a brief discussion of the political economy of SEC rulemaking
in the current environment.
A. Comparative Institutional Analysis
In the next few pages, this Part provides a comparative analysis
of the potential rulemaking institutions for issuing the proposed
insider trading materiality guidance. The analysis proceeds in four
steps, representing the four factors in the analytical framework:
comparative institutional capacity, comparative institutional
competence, comparative institutional impartiality, and
comparative legal transition costs.151
1. Comparative Institutional Capacity
The federal courts, Congress, and the SEC all currently share
capacity for insider trading regulation in the United States. The
courts have exercised broad jurisdiction over insider trading
actions under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.152 Congressional
power to regulate insider trading under the interstate commerce
clause is similarly broad.153 In principle part, however, the U.S.
Congress has delegated its power to the SEC in Section 10(b),154
151. See Heminway, supra note 64.
152. See, e.g., John I. McMahon, Jr., Note, A Statutory Definition of Insider
Trading: The Need to Codify the Misappropriation Theory, 13 DEL. J. CORP. L.
985, 990 (1988) (referencing “the power of the courts, depending on their
particular interpretation of Rule 10b-5, to limit or expand the SEC's ability to
successfully prosecute insider traders and protect the financial integrity of the
securities market”); Thomas C. Mira, Comment, The Measure of Disgorgement
in SEC Enforcement Actions Against Inside Traders Under Rule 10b-5, 34
CATH. U. L. REV. 445, 456 (1985) (“The most widely used enforcement tool in
insider trading cases has been section 21(d) of the 1934 Act, which provides the
SEC with authority to bring suit in federal courts to enjoin violations of the
securities laws.”).
153. See generally Heminway, supra note 64, at 248−52 (describing
congressional power to regulate matters of corporate governance).
154. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006) (prohibiting generally the use or employment
in connection with securities trading of “any manipulative or deceptive device or
contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission
may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the
protection of investors” (emphasis added)).
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the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984,155 and the Insider
Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988,156 and by
inaction. The SEC has exercised this authority to propose and
adopt numerous regulations under Section 10(b), including Rules
10b-5, 10b5-1, and 10b5-2,157 all of which pertain to insider
trading. In sum, although all three institutions have capacity to
regulate the elements of insider trading, including materiality,
Congress has (1) expressly delegated regulatory authority over
insider trading to the SEC and the federal courts in various
legislative pronouncements and (2) has otherwise implicitly left the
heavy lifting in U.S. insider trading regulation to the SEC and the
courts.158
155. Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-376, 98 Stat.
1264 (1984) (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.); see also Liu Duan,
Comment, The Ongoing Battle Against Insider Trading: A Comparison of
Chinese and U.S. Law and Comments on How China Should Improve Its Insider
Trading Law Enforcement Regime, 12 DUQ. BUS. L.J. 129, 137 (2009) (“[T]he
U.S. Congress enacted several supplementary rules including the Insider
Trading Sanctions Act of 1984 (ITSA), which authorizes the SEC to ask the
courts to impose penalties on illegal traders and upon those who tip nonpublic
information to third parties” (footnote omitted)).
156. Insider Trading & Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, Pub. L.
No. 100-704, 102 Stat. 4677 (1988) (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.);
see also Liu Duan, supra note 155, at 137 noting that “the Insider Trading and
Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988 (ITSFEA), . . . gives the SEC
authorization to ask courts to impose a civil penalty of three times the profit
from illegal insider trading.” (footnotes omitted)).
157. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2012); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1; 17 C.F.R. §
240.10b5-2.
158. See United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 573 (2d Cir. 1991)
(Winter, J., dissenting) (“Even the most fervent opponents of insider trading
must concede that the language of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 is at best a
general authorization to the SEC and to the courts to fashion rules founded
largely on those tribunals’ judgments as to why insider trading is or is not
fraudulent, deceptive or manipulative.”); Shalini M. Aggarwal, From The
Individual to the Institution: The SEC’s Evolving Strategy for Regulating the
Capital Markets, 2003 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 581, 590 (“Insider trading law has
primarily developed through enforcement rulemaking and is prosecuted through
recourse to the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws.” (footnotes
omitted)); Richard J. Morgan, Insider Trading and the Infringement of Property
Rights, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 79, 83 (1987) (“Notwithstanding the apparent
difficulties with grounding an administrative and judicial doctrine of insider
trading regulation on authorities as ill-suited as Section 10b and Rule 10b-5, the
lower courts and the SEC proceeded to do just that.”); Larry E. Ribstein,
Federalism and Insider Trading, 6 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 123, 125 (1988) (“An
acorn of vague language in the 1934 Act gradually became the sapling of
equally vague but broader language in SEC Rule 10b-5 and finally a forest of
federal anti-fraud law, with a large grove of insider trading law. This process
happened partly because of judicial and bureaucratic incentives and politically
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2. Comparative Institutional Capacity
Typically, the judiciary does not have much expertise in
securities regulation.159 However, because of the significant
judicial decision-making that has constructed and refined insider
trading doctrine in the United States, the federal courts are wellversed in the law defining and interpreting materiality in the
insider trading context. Yet, despite this substantive expertise,
courts are ill equipped, as a general matter, to assemble the
information and resources necessary to engage in comprehensive
rulemaking in an area like materiality. A court depends on having a
case before it that allows it to rule on a particular matter; the
manner of regulation of the judiciary is, therefore, by its nature,
unpredictable and incremental rather than regular and
comprehensive.160 In addition, the judiciary is independent. The
activities of individual judges across the U.S. District Courts and
the Circuit Courts of Appeal are not formally coordinated, except
through stare decisis, when applicable.161 It would be very difficult
for the federal courts, in spite of their expertise in materiality
standards in insider trading, to fashion comprehensive materiality
guidance with alternating presumptions over a range of facts.
Similarly, the structure and expertise of the U.S. Congress are
not optimal for the task of adopting and implementing materiality
guidance in the context of insider trading. Structurally, Congress is
better equipped to handle the comprehensive rulemaking
represented in the proposed materiality guidance.162 A bill defining
materiality in the context of insider trading could be introduced, an
agenda for vetting the bill could be established, and congressional
committees could work through the language.163 However,
Congress has judiciously avoided defining and otherwise
legislating in the area of insider trading,164 creating doubt about its
powerful groups, and partly because the courts had developed no clear
guidelines that might constrain the growth of the law.”).
159. See, e.g., Peter G. Morrissey, Note, Regulating Risk in Financial
Markets: Private Insurance for Public Funds, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1163, 1174
(1996) (“Judges rarely have a detailed background in securities trading and
financial market innovation.”).
160. See Heminway, supra note 64, at 292−94.
161. See id. at 295 (“[N]ational uniformity may be difficult to achieve as
across all of the federal districts and circuits.”).
162. See id. at 266.
163. See id. at 265−66.
164. See, e.g., Michael P. Kenny & Teresa D. Thebaut, Misguided Statutory
Construction to Cover the Corporate Universe: The Misappropriation Theory of
Section 10(b), 59 ALB. L. REV. 139, 168 (1995) (“Congress has refused to define
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capacity and willingness to take on the substantive details of
insider trading regulation (and also raising uncertainty about where
the definition of materiality for insider trading purposes might fit
within the existing statutory framework). The level of detail in the
proposed materiality guidance does not lend itself well to the
political, partisan, public debate that characterizes the U.S.
Congress. The proposed guidance was constructed through a
synthesis and careful balancing of principles from decisional law
and other resources. This is not the kind of job that Congress does
efficiently or effectively.
In addition, although the U.S. Congress has significant
experience and aptitude in drafting statutory definitions, the
definition of materiality in insider trading regulation is a highly
specialized, judicially constructed definition that operates in a rich,
detailed regulatory construct. This is not, in general, the type of
matter over which Congress would have institutional expertise.165
“Of our . . . branches of government, the specialized executive
regulatory agencies, such as the Securities and Exchange

insider trading”); Richard W. Painter, Insider Trading and the Stock Market
Thirty Years Later, 50 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 305, 310 (1999) (“[T]his
commentator remains concerned that Congress has yet to enact a statutory
definition of illegal insider trading”); A.C. Pritchard, Justice Lewis F. Powell,
Jr., and the Counterrevolution in the Federal Securities Laws, 52 DUKE L.J.
841, 934 (2003) (“Congress was unable to agree on a definition of insider
trading.”); Steven Thel, Section 12(2) of the Securities Act: Does Old
Legislation Matter?, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 1183, 1198 (1995) (“Congress has
refrained from defining the law’s parameters. Instead, it has left the formulation
of the private liability regime to the courts.”); Gregory G. Faragasso, Note, A
Policy Analysis Of New York State's Security Takeover Disclosure Act, 53
BROOK. L. REV. 1117, 1142 n.140 (1988) (“The Securities Industry Association,
along with a number of lawyers, Wall Street executives, and lawmakers, have
urged Congress to adopt a statutory definition of insider trading.”); Morrissey,
supra note 159, at 1174−75 (“Congress recognizes that it lacks much of the
expertise required for detailed regulation of the securities industry.”).
165. See Heminway, supra note 64, at 274 (“[C]commentators acknowledge
that expertise on highly specialized matters of substantive law and regulation
(including corporate and securities law) generally are outside the actual and
potential expertise of legislatures, because of the significant experience, time,
and other resources needed to develop that expertise.”); Note, The Case for
Federal Threats in Corporate Governance, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2726, 2739
(2005) (“Congress lacks the requisite capability and information to make
efficient corporate law decisions.”); Mary Buffington, Comment, Separation of
Powers and the Independent Governmental Entity After Mistretta v. United
States, 50 LA. L. REV. 117, 119−120 (1989) (“Congress does not have the
necessary expertise and time to devote to specialized areas of regulation. . .
Congress delegates power to oversee and monitor specialized areas requiring
expertise, such as securities regulation.” (footnotes omitted)).
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Commission, . . . have more technical capability than the courts or
legislature.”166 The SEC has the best structural and substantive
competence for issuing materiality guidance in the context of
insider trading.
Judgments concerning what disclosure, if any, . . . should be
mandated are best made at this stage of the science, not by a
court under a very general materiality standard, but by an
agency with finance expertise. An administrative agency −
the Securities and Exchange Commission − has a technical
staff, is able to hold public hearings, and can, thus, receive
wide and expert input, and can specify forms of disclosure, if
appropriate. It can propose rules for comment and can easily
amend rules that do not work well in practice.167
Although the SEC’s reputation as a federal agency has been
damaged by its failure to detect and prevent major instances of
securities fraud (e.g., the Bernie Madoff affair) and its contributing
role in the financial crisis,168 the SEC has undergone significant
reform efforts leading up to and in the wake of the Dodd-Frank
Act.169 The Commission is well positioned to deploy its
reorganized expert staff members to evaluate, enhance, and
introduce the materiality guidance in a deliberate, accessible
manner through the appropriate agency channels.170

166. Morrissey, supra note 159, at 1175.
167. Lewis v. Vogelstein, 699 A.2d 327, 332−333 (Del. Ch. 1997).
168. Renee M. Jones, Legitimacy and Corporate Law: The Case for
Regulatory Redundancy, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 1273, 1309 n.159 (2009) (“The
SEC’s reputation has suffered badly as a result of the financial crisis and other
major scandals.”); David P. McCaffrey, Review of the Policy Debate Over Short
Sale Regulation During the Market Crisis, 73 ALB. L. REV. 483, 518 (2010)
(“[R]eports regarding Bernard Madoff's fraud and other matters related to the
financial crisis damaged the SEC’s reputation in 2008-2009, and a reputational
survey in 2009 rated the SEC lowest of six federal agencies listed.”).
169. See, e.g., Joan MacLeod Heminway, Sustaining Reform Efforts at the
SEC: A Progress Report, 30 No. 4 BANKING & FIN. SERV. POLICY REPORT 1
(2011) [hereinafter Progress Report]; Joan MacLeod Heminway, Reframing and
Reforming the Securities and Exchange Commission: Lessons from Literature
on Change Leadership, 55 VILL. L. REV. 627 (2010).
170. See generally Jones, supra note 168, at 1308−18 (assessing and
praising, in relative terms, the SEC’s deliberative rulemaking process in the
post-crisis era); see also Heminway, supra note 64, at 275−82 (raising similar
points in the pre-crisis era).
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3. Comparative Institutional Impartiality
The federal courts are, as a general principal, the most
impartial sources of rulemaking.171 Congress is the most likely to
be subject to influence and bias,172 and the SEC typically is more
impartial than Congress but less so than the federal courts.173
Specifically, the accessibility of Congress makes it subject to
lobbying by various public interest groups.174 Moreover, Congress
is a highly politicized body.175 These attributes have hampered
various rulemaking projects in the past few years. The SEC is not,
however, immune to similar charges. Interest groups, primarily
those representing the securities industry, may exert powerful
influence over the SEC,176 and the Commissioners do split
decisions on some important matters along political lines.177
The proposal to issue guidance on materiality in the insider
trading context recommended in this article is not a highly
politicized initiative. If crafted and promoted properly, it should be
received as unremarkable (given its objective of clarifying the
materiality standard within the bounds of existing law and
regulation) and should appeal to both business leaders and
investors alike because it balances business and investor
considerations through per se rules and presumptions derived from
existing disclosure guidance. As a result, the influences to which
171. See Heminway, supra note 64, at 327−32.
172. See id. at 307−18.
173. See id. at 319−26.
174. See id. at 313−16; Nathan Alexander Sales, Secrecy and National
Security Investigations, 58 ALA. L. REV. 811, 831 (2007) (“Familiar public
choice principles instruct that, as is true any time Congress makes policy that
affects industry or public interest groups, there is the possibility of capture.”).
175. See Jones, supra note 168, at 1302 (“[T]he partisanship and ideological
rigidity that characterizes Congress in recent decades . . . creates obstacles to
meaningful substantive debates. These factors limit Congress’s ability to act
decisively on corporate issues except in times of crisis.”).
176. See Stephen J. Choi, Behavioral Economics and the Regulation of
Public Offerings, 10 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 85, 134 (2006) (“[T]he SEC may
simply invoke ‘investor confidence’ without really meaning it, instead catering
to the needs of powerful interest groups in the securities industry. Detailing the
assumptions the SEC makes with respect to investors may help expose flaws and
inconsistencies in the assumptions and regulatory regime, thereby focusing
attention on the possibility of other, more public choice motives behind the
SEC’s actions.”).
177. See, e.g., John Reiss & Colin Diamond, Explanation and Practical Tips
Regarding the SEC’s New Proxy Access Regime, 14 THE M&A LAWYER 1 (Oct.
2010), available at http://www.wsgr.com/publications/PDFSearch/mal1010.pdf;
Douglas A. McIntyre, Goldman Sachs: SEC Commissioners Often Vote 3-2
along Party Lines, 24/7 WALL ST., April 19, 2010, http://247wallst.com/2010/
04/19/goldman-sachs-sec-commissioners-often-vote-3-2-along-party-lines/.
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each rulemaking institution is subject and the biases exhibited by
each institution are not as important in the choice of an optimal
rule maker for the materiality guidance suggested in this article as
other factors.
4. Comparative Legal Transition Costs
As a general matter, the costs of legal change associated with
adoption of the proposed materiality guidance are positively
impacted by the fact that the guidance works within existing legal
and practice norms. Few costs differ as across the various possible
rule makers, except that costs in certain areas will be higher for
guidance issued through court opinions, because of the slow,
incremental, uncontrolled fashion in which judicial rulemaking
takes place.
Learning costs—the cost of learning the new rule178—should
be low, as a general matter, given that there is very little new
substantive information in the proposed materiality guidance; the
value of the guidance is in the consolidation of that information
and the process for engagement with it. The purpose and effect of
issuing the guidance is to clarify the application of the existing
materiality standard in certain factual settings by making the
process and result more clear. As a result, the guidance should
predominantly make clearer and simpler what transaction planners,
litigators, counsel, and others already should know—or would
know after conducting targeted research—and assure greater
consistency and predictability in any resulting thought processes,
advice, and enforcement.
The detailed, tailored materiality guidance offered supra Part II
is designed to minimize uncertainty costs across all institutions.179
However, there will certainly be identifiable transition costs. For
example, lawyers and their clients may have to give up or revise
existing thought processes and systems for assessing the risks
associated with purchases and sales of securities, balance sheet
accounting, and acquisition proposals and establish new ones as a
means of ensuring compliance with the guidance. And although
“acquisition proposal” is defined in Part II,180 there no doubt will
be definitional and other interpretive questions that will arise with
respect to that definition and other, undefined terms and concepts
employed in the guidance. Also, the burden of proof and

178. See Heminway, supra note 64, at 334−36.
179. See id. at 337−41.
180. See supra Part II.B.1.
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procedural effects components of the guidance181 are difficult to
convey and apply, which may result in additional learning costs. It
will be easier to keep the text as clear, coherent, and
comprehensive as possible if the materiality guidance is issued at a
single time by one rulemaking institution, i.e., the U.S. Congress or
the SEC (rather than in individual cases by the federal courts).
Finally, in clarifying materiality, the proposed guidance may
inadvertently discourage some transactions that the rule maker did
not intend to frustrate or encourage some transactions that the rule
maker did not intend to promote.
There should be few development and administrative costs in
implementing the proposed materiality guidance because there
should be little need for new business standards and tools to assure
compliance with that guidance. However, issuers will likely want
to revise their securities trading compliance programs to conform
to the per se materiality rules and presumptions of materiality and
immateriality offered in the guidance. The costs of these changes
will be lower for congressional and SEC rulemaking because it
would be done comprehensively, all at one time (while judicial
rulemaking would push toward comprehensive guidance
incrementally over a period of time). In general, it is more
distracting and costly to continue to adjust internal and external
transaction terms and tools in stages.
Some inter-firm development and administrative costs will take
time to implement even if Congress or the SEC implements the
proposed materiality guidance. Merger and acquisition agreements
and other transactional contracts and instruments may need to be
modified to reflect the certainty and predictability introduced to
transaction processes through the proposed materiality guidance.
Parties will negotiate their new forms, and later regulatory actions
and court opinions will validate or invalidate those forms. Yet, if
the materiality guidance were to be undertaken through judicial
rulemaking, this process would be slower and potentially could
remain incomplete for quite a long time.
Finally, error costs likely will occur, as with any new rule.
Although the substance of the proposed materiality guidance is
relatively clear and carefully drawn, those who use the guidance
(transaction planners, litigants, and their counsel, as well as
regulators, enforcement agents, and judges) will no doubt make
mistakes in its expression and application. Dispute resolution and
its attendant costs then will result. These costs, like learning costs,
are best avoided with careful drafting, regardless of whether that
drafting is done by courts, Congress, or the SEC.
181. See supra Parts II.A.2 & II.B.5.
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5. Resulting Comparative Institutional Choice
In sum, the SEC has capacity to issue the proposed materiality
guidance, has the most favorable combined structural and
substantive institutional competence, is relatively free from
influence and bias in connection with materiality rulemaking, and
(together with the U.S. Congress) best minimizes anticipated legal
transition costs associated with the issuance of the guidance.
However, given the relative structural competence and impartiality
of the federal courts, they represent a viable second-choice rule
maker for the materiality guidance. Although congressional
rulemaking is less incremental (which would decrease costs),
Congress has less expertise than the SEC and the federal courts in
the area of materiality in the insider trading context. Also,
Congress is a more politicized body, which may slow down the
rule making process and increase costs, even though the materiality
guidance is unlikely to be a partisan proposal). The SEC,
therefore, is the most appropriate rulemaking institution for the
materiality guidance, and the federal courts are the next-best
institutional choice.
B. The Political Economy of Current SEC Rulemaking
When work on this project commenced, rulemaking under the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002182 and the SEC’s 2005 offering
reform initiatives183 had concluded. The SEC, under regulatory fire
for much of the new millennium, was in a period of relative repose.
It was seemingly a good time to suggest new rulemaking. Today is
another day . . . .
Commentators on this project have argued, some of them quite
persuasively, that the SEC is unlikely to engage in rulemaking in
this area at this time. The SEC has been repeatedly (explicitly or
implicitly, in different contexts) invited to do so, including in
connection with insider trading-related rulemaking, and has
declined the invitation.184 Moreover, the SEC’s current operations
182. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745
(codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. and 18 U.S.C.).
183. Securities Offering Reform, Securities Act Release No. 33-8591, 70
Fed. Reg. 44,722, 44,731 (Aug. 3, 2005). See also Joseph F. Morrissey, Rhetoric
and Reality: Investor Protection and the Securities Regulation Reform of 2005,
56 CATH. U.L. REV. 561 (2007) (describing and critiquing the SEC’s 2005
offering reforms).
184. For example, in promulgating Regulation FD (an insider-trading-related
rule concerning the selective disclosure of material nonpublic information to
market professionals), the SEC stated:
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are underfunded and understaffed, and the fulfillment of regulatory
requirements under the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act (and, more recently, the Jumpstart Our
Business Startups Act,185 or JOBS Act, for short) is a significant
ongoing burden for the agency.186 The suggestion that the SEC
engage in new voluntary legislative or nonlegislative rulemaking
on its own motion is, indeed, likely to be unpopular at the present
time.
Two other productive paths are possible. The SEC could, in lieu
of rulemaking, adopt the suggested materiality guidance as a
statement of internal policy for use in making enforcement
decisions.
Policy statements are nonlegislative rules that tentatively
indicate how agency decisionmakers will exercise a
discretionary power. Such rules might, for example, isolate
the factors that should be considered in making decisions,
rank priorities, set tolerance levels, explain when
dispensations should be granted, build flexibility into
overly rigid rules, indicate what data are relevant, or

Some commenters suggested that the regulation include a bright-line
standard or other limitation on what was material for purposes of
Regulation FD, or identify in the regulation an exclusive list of types of
information covered. While we acknowledged in the Proposing Release
that materiality judgments can be difficult, we do not believe an
appropriate answer to this difficulty is to set forth a bright-line test, or
an exclusive list of “material” items for purposes of Regulation FD.
See U.S. SEC’S & EXCH. COMM’N, Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading,
Release No. 33-7881, Aug. 21, 2000, available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/
final/33-7881.htm (footnote omitted). Rule 10b5-1 and 10b5-2, both insider
trading rules, also decline to define materiality, even though each rule uses the
word material. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1 (2012) (defining when a purchase or
sale constitutes trading “on the basis of” material nonpublic information in
insider trading cases brought under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5); § 240.10b5-2
(setting forth a non-exclusive definition of circumstances in which a person has
a duty of trust or confidence for purposes of the misappropriation theory of
insider trading). The preliminary note to each rule specifically notes that “[t]he
law of insider trading is otherwise defined by judicial opinions construing Rule
10b-5, and Rule 10b5-1 does not modify the scope of insider trading law in any
other respect.” Id.
185. H.R. 3606, 112th Congress (2012), available at http://www.gpo.gov/
fdsys/pkg/BILLS-112hr3606enr/pdf/BILLS-112hr3606enr.pdf.
186. See Heminway, Progress Report, supra note 169, at 9–11 (regarding
SEC underfunding in the wake of the Dodd-Frank Act).
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otherwise narrow the available decisional referents that
must be taken into account.187
This approach is certain to be more palatable (even if not more
popular) and, if publicly announced, could have similar positive
effects not just on the exercise of enforcement discretion but also
on transactional decision-making. However, this approach still
requires SEC decision-making and, therefore, the expenditure of
scarce agency resources. Assuming the SEC is maximizing utility,
it will weigh the benefits and costs and determine whether the
former justify the latter.188 In fact, as a federal agency, its
rulemaking is reviewed for cost-effectiveness.189 This calculus may
well lead the SEC to forego rulemaking activity on materiality, at
least at the present time. Accordingly, as a next-best option, this
article suggests that federal courts engage the type of analysis
suggested here in adjudicating materiality disputes in insider
trading actions involving improper balance sheet accounting and
failed merger discussions as they arise.
IV. THE RESULTING MATERIALITY GUIDANCE PROPOSAL
The SEC may exercise one of several options in adopting and
disseminating the proposed materiality guidance. It could, for
example, propose one or more new rules (perhaps Rule 10b5-3 and
Rule 10b5-4) for notice and comment under the APA.190 The
adoption of legislative rules through the APA notice-and-comment
process is a traditional and well-used approach for the SEC.
Among other things, the notice-and-comment process provides
transparency and enhances legitimacy.191 However, this path offers
disadvantages similar to those provided by an open, public
congressional process (although, as an indirectly representative
body, the SEC should be in a position to control the process and its
outcome better than Congress). Among other things, the
deliberativeness of the notice-and-comment process can be costly
in terms of time and money.192 In the alternative, the SEC could
issue an interpretive release or policy statement193 because the
187. Asimow, supra note 18, at 386–87.
188. See id. at 404–05.
189. See generally Susan Rose-Ackerman, Putting Cost-Benefit Analysis in
Its Place: Rethinking Regulatory Review, 65 U. MIAMI L. REV. 335 (2011)
(describing and critiquing cost-benefit analysis in regulatory review).
190. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2006).
191. See Asimow, supra note 18, at 402–03.
192. See id. at 403–04.
193. See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
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materiality guidance represents an agency interpretation of a term
used in existing law (both statutory and decisional) and regulation
within the ambit of the SEC’s mandate.
The former (APA notice-and-comment) approach permits a full
public vetting of the proposed guidance. Yet, that traditional
approach seems heavy-handed as a means of adopting a set of
materiality guidelines for use by transaction planners, enforcement
agents, and others in shaping their actions. The latter approach—
issuance of an interpretive release or policy statement—seems
more appropriate for this purpose and, if properly drafted as a
nonlegislative rule,194 may allow the SEC to reduce costs by
issuing the release without compliance with the APA’s notice-andcomment process. If the guidance constitutes a legislative rule, the
SEC will be required to give notice and receive comments before
issuing a final release including the guidance.195
Although some may be concerned that the SEC is less familiar
than the federal courts in working with presumptions or that the
SEC lacks experience in designing rules that include presumptions,
the SEC is no stranger to navigating and drafting presumptions. In
fact, Rule 10b5-1,196 one of the SEC’s rules on insider trading,
establishes a presumption of liability for insider trading based on
an actor’s awareness of material nonpublic information.197 Other
examples of the explicit and implicit use of presumptions in SEC
rulemaking abound.198 Accordingly, concern about SEC
experience in this type of rulemaking is unwarranted.
194. See supra notes 24 & 25 and accompanying text.
195. See generally David L. Franklin, Legislative Rules, Nonlegislative
Rules, and the Perils of the Short Cut, 120 YALE L.J. 276 (2010) (describing and
addressing aspects of this problem); Thomas J. Fraser, Interpretive Rules: Can
the Amount of Deference Accorded Them Offer Insight into the Procedural
Inquiry?, 90 B.U. L. Rev. 1303 (2010) (same); Richard J. Pierce, Jr.,
Distinguishing Legislative Rules from Interpretative Rules, 52 ADMIN. L. REV.
547, 551 (2000) (same).
196. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1 (2012).
197. See United States v. Causey, No. H-04-025-SS, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
39619, *15 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 28, 2005) (“Rule 10b5-1 creates an Adler-type
presumption that a defendant is liable for insider trading upon proof that he or
she was aware of the material, nonpublic information when the securities trade
at issue occurred . . . .”); Newby v. Lay (In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative &
ERISA Litig.), 258 F. Supp. 2d 576, 592 (S.D. Tex. 2003) (“The rule . . .
create[s] a rebuttable presumption: a plaintiff makes a prima facie case that the
defendant is liable for insider trading merely by showing that the defendant was
‘aware of the material nonpublic information’ when he made the purchase or
sale of the securities.” (emphasis added) (citation omitted)).
198. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 240.19g2-1(b)(2) (establishing a rebuttable
presumption of control in connection with national securities exchange and
registered securities association compliance); 17 C.F.R. § 240.19h-1(f)(2)
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Writing the release will be somewhat tricky, however, because
of the nature of the information to be conveyed and the nature of
the audience. The proposed materiality guidance is detailed and, in
a number of aspects, technical. The audience is diverse, ranging
from employees to officers and directors of issuers, to legal
counsel, regulators, and the judiciary. How can an interpretive
release convey the appropriate level of detail to give useful
guidance (and minimize the costs of legal change) and at the same
time reach all of these audiences?
I propose that the SEC issue the guidance in a question-andanswer (“Q&A”) or frequently-asked-questions (“FAQ”) format.
The SEC has written many interpretive releases in a Q&A or FAQ
format199 and also includes on its website questions and answers
culled from telephonic interactions between the SEC staff and the
public (although the last supplement was in 2004).200 The SEC also
hosts Q&A and FAQ pages on its website about a variety of
topics.201 A Q&A format allows for the segmentation of complex
information and the presentation of that information in a userfriendly manner.

(2012) (creating a rebuttable presumption of control in connection with certain
self-regulatory organization notices); 17 C.F.R. § 248.120 (instituting a
presumption in defining control under Regulation S-AM); 17 C.F.R. § 275.2042(a)(14)(iii) (noting a presumption of materiality in connection with record
maintenance by investment advisers).
199. See, e.g., U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, Commission Guidance on the
Application of Certain Provisions of the Securities Act of 1933, the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, and Rules thereunder to Trading in Security Futures
Products, Release No. 33-8107, 34-46101 (June 24, 2002), available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/interp/33-8107.htm; U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N,
Regulation of Transfer Agents, Release No. 34-17111 (Sept. 11, 1980), available
at http://www.sec.gov/rules/interp/1980/34-17111.pdf.
200. See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, Manual of Publicly Available
Telephone Interpretations, http://www.sec.gov/interps/telephone.shtml (last
modified Feb. 2, 2007).
201. See, e.g., U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, Division of Investment
Management: Frequently Asked Questions About Form 13F, http://www.sec.
gov/divisions/investment/13ffaq.htm (last modified Sept. 21, 2011); SEC. &
EXCH. COMM’N, Division of Market Regulation: Answers to Frequently Asked
Questions Concerning Rule 10b-18 (“Safe Harbor” for Issuer Repurchases),
http://www.sec.gov/divisions/marketreg/r10b18faq0504.htm (last modified Nov
17, 2004); SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, Q&A: Small Business and the SEC,
http://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/qasbsec.htm (last modified Nov. 14, 2009).
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V. CONCLUSION
The Initial Materiality Article, concluded with the overall
observation that
[f]air and honest securities markets, investor confidence in
those markets, and accurate and complete public disclosure
in the insider trading regulation context all can be enhanced
by the adoption of more precise materiality guidance for
use in insider trading analysis. This guidance for
determining materiality can be fashioned by creating a
meaningful overarching process for determining
materiality, consistent with existing law, and rigorously
applying that process to common factual settings in various
areas of materiality analysis. If properly crafted, the
materiality guidance resulting from this process would
support applicable policy and enhance predictability and
certainty in the ex ante and ex post application of Rule 10b5 in the insider trading context. Given the desirability of
fostering market integrity and confidence in the current
securities trading environment, Congress, the SEC, or the
courts should take action to provide enhanced materiality
guidance for use by issuers and insiders . . . .202
Almost ten years later, nothing has been done to further this
agenda, despite the fact that, in the intervening time, the SEC and
the U.S. Department of Justice have engaged in noteworthy
enforcement of insider trading prohibitions under Section 10(b)
and Rule 10b-5. Many of these public enforcement activities
(inquiries, investigations, the commencement of legal actions, etc.)
have involved the exercise of significant enforcement discretion.
Uncertainties in the application of the materiality doctrine in
insider trading actions raise questions about the fair, efficient, and
effective use of that discretion.203 The materiality doctrine in U.S.
202. Heminway, supra note 43, at 1212.
203. See supra note 53 and accompanying text (concerning the possibility of
bias in insider trading enforcement); Heminway, supra note 5, at 1046 (“If the
basis for and substance of insider trading regulation under Section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5 are clarified, enforcement agents will have less opportunity to cloak
their selective enforcement efforts—including those resulting from bias—in the
unclear policy underlying and elements of U.S. insider trading regulation.”);
Heminway, supra note 43, at 1169−70 (“If public and private enforcement of the
securities laws is to be an effective method of preventing and punishing fraud,
manipulation, and deception as a means of assuring investors of the integrity of
our securities markets, then U.S. securities regulation should allow for more
straightforward identification and punishment of violators.”).
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insider trading regulation represents a significant area of
uncertainty.
The SEC is capable of giving enhanced materiality guidance
for use in guiding the decision-making and activities of transaction
planners in a manner that does no violence to—and, in fact, is
likely to improve—the system of insider trading regulation in the
U.S. All that remains is for the SEC to develop the institutional
will and marshal the necessary resources to act on the proposals
outlined in this article, and others like them, relating to areas of
uncertainty in insider trading doctrine. This is, unmistakably, no
small task in the current unsupportive environment in which the
SEC operates.
In the absence of that institutional will and those resources,
federal courts hearing insider trading cases that raise issues
addressed in the proposed guidance offered in this article can use
that guidance in their decision making. The federal courts have
constructed U.S. insider trading law in prominent part and can
have a role in clarifying the doctrine. Because the guidance
offered here distills important concepts from SEC rulemaking,
interpretations and practices followed by the Division of
Corporation Finance and the Office of the Chief Accountant, and
existing federal decisional law, it offers important persuasive
authority to the judiciary (as well as to transaction lanners and
legal advisors).
For all of these reasons, this author’s entreaty to the SEC and
the federal courts regarding materiality guidance in the insider
trading context: “Just do it!”

